Illusionary Progress

We live in an age of great technological success, in an atmosphere of materialistic philosophy tempered with misgivings and regrets, in a turmoil of social change and of conflicting political ideologies. We are uneasy with forebodings, for civilization may well die in the next war if it comes. We are little consoled by the prospect of dying amid new luxuries. Brilliant progress in the technological application of science stands in sharpest contrast with the social chaos of our generation. Will the critical historian of 3000 A.D. remember us chiefly for our success in one area or for our failure in the other? Can the echelons of science be diverted in part from the sector where they have won us an overwhelming victory to that where the battle turns against us? When and how? In the present article I shall suggest for the physical sciences a diversion of much effort from gadgetry to an extensive study of man himself, and for the biological sciences a keener, more integrative appraisal of evolutionary history as the basis for extrapolating from the past the course of man’s inevitable social destiny? (Williams 1948, 116)

It is scarcely necessary to belabor the point that within the past two centuries man has made unprecedented progress in the natural sciences. Basing action on this newly acquired knowledge he has harnessed steam, electricity, chemical reaction, and, presently, atomic fission to do his bidding. He has tapped field, forest, and subterranean depths for fuel, food, and materials of construction. He has erected towering cities, spanned the continents with rail and roadway, and girdled the globe with wires, radio beams, and swift flights of air armadas. Mechanical power and assembly lines have multiplied a hundred or a thousand fold the yield of goods from his hand and brain and eye. An economy of abundance is at length possible, but:— (Williams 1948, 116)

As ever increasing fraction of the fruits of human toil and ingenuity goes to feed the holocaust of war. The greatest drain on the exchequer of every government is the cost of present and past wars. The waste of ruined cities and scarred countrysides spreads over three continents where rose the most ancient of historic civilizations. More utter devastation looms on the horizon through the latest and most momentous of man’s scientific discoveries. Social progress since Roman times seems almost negligible. If legalized slavery has been well nigh abolished, chivalry has also waned. Conflicting political concepts of earliest history still persist in unresolved modern controversies. Democracy has just disarmed three major tyrannies at great cost but faces still another. The remaining one [i.e., Russian revolution] professes a prophetic vision for all mankind when its aegis shall have spread around the globe. (Williams 1948, 116)

The Russian people do not want war. Most probably the Russian government does not want it. Certainly neither the people nor the government of the United States desire World War III. Yet some inexorable force seems to impel both governments (and peoples) in that direction. Neither the leaders whom the Russians have chosen or accepted nor the leaders whom Americans follow are able to lead in the direction which everbody wants to go. Why? Because Russian thought and American thought are as far apart as the poles with reference to the basic political means which will achieve the universally desired end. There are no universally accepted political principles. Nothing indisputable has been learned in 5000 years of racial history. There is no scientific knowledge about politics. (Williams 1948, 116-117)

In economics the condition is essentially the same. There are almost as many schools of thought as there are thinkers. None will deny the tremendous impact of scientific technology upon our present economy, but beyond that few economic principles are universally accepted. The most elemental matters are in dispute: private property versus communal ownership; personal rights versus governmental sovereignty; economic versus political boundaries. Free trade versus protective tariff is, for example, still merely a matter of opinion. Our social systems are extremely diverse, and class strife of various sorts has rarely been more conspicuous. At best society is static; at worst, and more prevailingly, society moves off in all directions at one and gets nowhere. Fundamentally this is because social science is not science; its foundations are utterly insecure. It has no basis for proceeding from the known to the unknown, for virtually no principles are established beyond dispute. (Williams 1948, 117)

Scientists, however, have no occasion to be supercilious or sacrosanct. The failure of political, social, and economic theory to make progress is an old story. We are doing no worse than in Roman times, merely no better. The prime reason for the contrast lies in this, that for the most part in natural sciences we enjoy the benefits of the experimental method. We guess what should happen by a priori reasoning and then design a careful experiment whereby we verify or confound our prior reasoning. In social science the practice is to reason a priori and then assert the conclusion to be true. The experimental method is not practically available in social matters [except via historical perspective]. We may enact a measure, say the Smoot-Hawley act, but long before the experiment is complete a war, a new technology, a change of administration, or some other country’s countermeasure intervenes to invalidate any conclusion. All our so-called social experiments in domestic economy are fraught with similar hazards. (Williams 1948, 117)

One of the difficulties of the social sciences is that their problems are always problems of immediate concern to large numbers of people. Vox populi raises a distraction to disturb any objective contemplation. Public opinion focuses its attention about some controversial problem, and those who become the political leaders are those whose views are acceptable to the majority. All other contenders are disqualified for the moment though a decade later they may have proved themselves wiser than their opponents. The successful political leader is one who correctly senses the trend of public opinion. As Disraeli once quizzically remarked, “I must follow the people. Am I not their leader?” (Williams 1948, 117-118)

(….) In social problems there is no appeal to natural science, and natural science as such seeks no opportunity to be heard. Yet I beg to submit that human affairs are by no means unrelated to the kind of universe in which we dwell and with which science is so much concerned. The difficulty is that science is prevailingly either preoccupied with isolated phenomena in Nature or with the gadgetry of technology. The direction of human affairs is by common consent relegated to a position outside the field of scientific enquiry. We have already referred to the sad fact that the experimental method is inapplicable to social science. Otherwise we might be more sure footed in our social progress. (Williams 1948, 118)

Physics and chemistry are supreme examples of experimental science. Together with mathematics they account for most of the technical progress man has made. However, there is a large field of true science which is essentially observational rather than experimental. Astronomy and geology furnish us with many significant examples. We cannot turn the stars in their courses to ascertain experimentally the result, so it is necessary to infer indirectly much of what has been learned about their motions, masses, and composition, as well as their past history and future destiny. Similarly, in geology we cannot experimentally raise mountains, divert the course of great streams, or reproduce the conditions of ancient lakes. Yet few would deny that astronomy and geology are true sciences or that their conclusions are broadly trustworthy. (Williams 1948, 118)

Biology as a field lies between those of purely experimental and purely observational science. Many of its problems can be and have been attacked experimentally and successfully. Some of the great problems of biology are set on a time scale so vast that short-lived man cannot deal with them experimentally. Otherwise we might perhaps prove the descent of man from lower creatures by producing him on the sport for evidential purposes. However, the evolutionary process can be observed in the laboratory by the use of short-lived lower organisms and it can be turned to immediate practical account in breeding plants and animals of specifically desired characteristics. In spite of its many debatable regions, biology ranks as a sound science. (Williams 1948, 119-119)

According to my view each of these types of method has a potential application in human affairs. (….) In a thousand ways each person differs form his fellows. What we call personality is an integration of ten thousand traits each determined in part by heredity, in part by training and in part by current habits and ways of life [e.g., culture]. Some of these traits doubtless have a physiological basis if it could be traced. Some are psychological yet have an underlying physical basis, and many fall in the class of spiritual qualities. (Williams 1948, 119)

Personality is a fact of vital importance in our human relations. Yet one could assemble a very imposing array of physiologists, biochemists, psychologists, and physicians only discover that the whole battery of talent could not account for [the nature of personality]. These personality factors are of tremendous importance in many of our social problems. (Williams 1948, 119)

(….) So much for the potential of experimental natural sciences which would be much more significant for future human welfare at this stage than a new plastic, a more efficient freezing unit, a faster airplane, or a flossier automobile. We could get along with what technology already offers in those lines, but we keenly need means of preventing frustrated, futile lives and of raising the whole level of human happiness. These things must be recognized as within the potential field of science. We must get out of our ruts of thinking in terms of a single discipline and in terms of the physical things used for food, shelter, raiment, transportation, or amusement. We ourselves are more important than our environment. (Williams 1948, 120)

There is, however, a whole category of human problems of which the crux lines in the massing of humanity, rather than in the individual. A large group of humans bond together by some real or fancied community of need or circumstances acts differently at times than each of them the component individuals would be disposed to do if acting independently. People divide into groups by race, by language, by flags, by economic level, form of employment, or special intellectual interest or aptitude. Once so divided we are prone to forget our common humanity and place all emphasis upon our national or class interest. It is by the operation of this form of mass psychology that the problems of international antagonisms, political animosities, class and racial hatreds arise. In the present era, war, industrial strife between employer and employee, and racial hatred appear as the most outstanding destructive forces. There are, however, numerous lesser rivalries exemplified, for example, by pressure groups of farmers, manufacturers, dairymen, or what not. The study of individuals will not meet these problems. (Williams 1948, 120)

The most significant contribution which science might make to this category of problems is an emphasis on our common human heritage and the oneness of human life with all the life which preceded it in the evolutionary process. That is the route by which we came to be human and that is the road by which man may grow to greater stature. Biological evolution arrays hundreds of millions of years before us. May not science discern its trends and consider their validity for man today? (Williams 1948, 120)

(….) However, our social trends need to be undergirded by some broad philosophy which, endeavors to estimate results at least a generation hence. No social course which veers abruptly first in one direction then in another can possibly lead us happily forward. Yet that is precisely what we do in civic, political, and national life. (….) We proceed by impulse, not according to a reasoned course which becomes ingrained in the fiber of the people. Imagine a business enterprise succeeding with such a fluctuating policy. (Williams 1948, 121)

A popular philosophy cannot become second nature to a people within a few weeks or months or years. Its culture must pervade our educational processes for decades before the philosophy can ripen and bear fruit. It is, however, high time that such a social philosophy be born and that it have the endorsement of a large element of our most thoughtful people. How better can it be born than out of the womb of science and how will it gather more commanding support than if it comes from scientists. Science today enjoys an unprecedented popular respect, and no voice speaks with as much authority as does the scientist who is backed by the general opinion of his fellows. (Williams 1948, 121)

We had such a philosophy at the time of the birth of our republic, and, in spite of some dissent, we believed in it as a people. In the words of the Declaration of Independence “We hold these truths to be self evident: That all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed;—” There are other philosophies abroad today. Not long since Hitler thundered “The state is everything, the individual nothing.” Today Russia’s Politburo justifies the dictatorship of a minority by defending its beneficent intentions. (Williams 1948, 121)

The divergent philosophies cannot all be true yet they were or are supported by the mass of scientists, as well as other people, resident in each of the respective countries. This could not possibly be true if science had generally recognized that humanity is a part of Nature and an outgrowth of her works. (Williams 1948, 121)

Some will object that evolution has had no consistent trends; that it has changed direction with climatic alterations as in the successive periods of glaciation. Its fundamental trends and causative factors have, however, in my opinion, maintained a high degree of constancy. The continuity of the evolutionary process has received amazing and unexpected support in the field of biochemistry during the past decade or two. The enzymes and other chemical mechanisms that operate in our tissues are present and operative also in the tissues of lower animals and even in plants and microorganisms for more primitive and far more ancient in their evolutionary origin. If life development has been so continuous that the oxidative mechanisms, for example, of its earliest forms of organisms are still operative in its latest and higher forms, it is scarcely reasonable to think its past trends are not still meaningful for man’s future. (Williams 1948, 121-122)

Evolution of Evolution

Atavism: The reappearance of an ancestral trait after many generations of absence. Dollo’s Law claims that “reverse evolution” never occurs for complex traits, but in fact there are exceptions. Atavisms can arise suddenly by mutation, but only rarely do they spread to fixation in a species. Sporadic throwbacks include hen’s teeth, horse’s toes, dew claws (extra digits) in dogs, premolars in mice, hindlimb flippers in dolphins and whales [148], and tails or extra nipples in humans. Possible reversions at the species level include frog teeth, lizard digits, reptile scales (= revived fish scales?), and dorsal fins in ichthyosaurs (= revamped fish fins?). One confirmed species-level atavism is sex-comb rotation in flies. One putative species-level atavism that was disproven involves wings in stick insects [2231].” (Held 2017, 264, How the Snake Lost its Legs: Curious Tales from the Frontier of Evo-Devo)

Held, Lewis I. Jr. (2017) How the Snake Lost its Legs: Curious Tales from the Frontier of Evo-Devo

How the vampire bat reinvented running

Bats are adept fliers, but most are clumsy on the ground. One exception is the vampire bat, Desmodus rotundus. When tested on a treadmill these bats run amazingly well. An analysis of their gait, published in 2005, showed that they “bound” into midair like mice, with their forefeet and hindfeet touching the ground at different times [1862]. The study’s authors argue that (1) the founders of the bat order had no need to run after they specialized as aerial insectivores, so (2) the neural circuits for running atrophied over millions of years (use it or lose it), but (3) vampire bats adapted to a new (blood-drinking) niche by reacquiring a running capability [1863]. Whether this talent is an atavism (old circuits revived) or a novelty (new circuits created) is unclear.

— Held, Lewis I. Jr. (2017) How the Snake Lost its Legs: Curious Tales from the Frontier of Evo-Devo

As it turns out, the miracle of complex life is more amazing, yet ironically simpler, than anyone ever expected. Researchers now know that life’s building materials are few, and they were “invented” near the dawn of animals. More specifically, a surprisingly small number of genes—”tool kit genes”—are the primary components for building all animals, and these genes emerged at a time before the Cambrian Explosion, some 600 million years ago. Thus the amazing diversity of the animal kingdom is the result of the flexibility of a small number of building blocks that have existed for eons.

This means, for example, that the gene that controls the formation of an arm on a human is the same gene that controls the formation of a wing on a bird, a fin on a fish, and a leg on a centipede, and that this gene has been around since the first animals grew the first appendage of any kind. Some prominent scientists have argued that if we could rewind the tape of life and start over again, the result would be a totally different world from that which exists today. They are wrong. Tool kit genes conserve the essence of animals, and they react to ecological cues in very consistent ways.

Carroll, Sean B. (2005) Endless Forms Most Beautiful: The New Science of Evo Devo

Introduction: Birth of a Scientific Field

Every scientific field, no matter how broad its reach, has one or more basic goals that define its shape and direction. The central aim of evolutionary developmental biology is to delineate the precise mechanisms, processes, and events that have been responsible for generating the astonishing diversity of animal and plant forms that characterize our planet. If this exploration is productive, we should eventually come to comprehend the evolutionary routes by which, for example, mice came to differ from men, spiders from butterflies, and dandelions from sequoias. Despite all that has been learned about the general nature of evolution since the publication of Charles Darwin’s The Origin of Species in 1859, we are only just beginning to fathom such divergent evolutionary trajectories at the level of the actual genetic, developmental, and historical details. (Wilkins 2002, 3)

Evolutionary Developmental Biology

By 1959, the year of the centenary of the publication of The Origin, the atmosphere within evolutionary biology circles was quietly but profoundly celebratory.18 The puzzle of evolution was considered essentially solved; what remained was the good, steady work of filling in the details. Indeed, one would have had to search diligently to find suggestions that there were any major gaps or omissions in evolutionary theory. With Schmalhausen silent and in retirement, and Goldschmidt dead, Waddington (1959) remained a rather isolated dissenting voice, calling out to the field that something important, the evolution of developmental processes, had been badly neglected. (Wilkins 2002: 31)

And then, starting in the early 1970s, the consensus about the sufficiency of the evolutionary synthesis began to melt and break up like an iceberg that has drifted into warmer waters. Disputes began to arise about the best ways to reconstruct evolutionary history (a detailed and provocative history of this debate is given in Hull, 1988) and about the significant modes of genetic mechanisms of evolutionary change (Eldredge and Gould, 1972; Stanley, 1979; Dover, 1982). One contributory factor, certainly, was the advent of new methodologies. If, to change the metaphor, the evolutionary pot was beginning to simmer again, one important source of heat was the new science of molecular biology. (Wilkins 2002: 31)

(….) Many years ago, from a detailed phylogenetic survey of the distribution of eye structures within the Metazoa, Salvini-Plawen and Mayr (1977) argued that eyes had evolved independently, perhaps as often as 20 times, in different metazoan phyla. Thus, in their reconstruction, there was no single ancestral eye form in the Metazoa. Furthermore, in their scheme, continuity of appearance of structures was a cardinal test of homology. In cephalopods, for instance, it seems certain that ancestral molluscan forms did not possess eyes. Therefore, the eyes of cephalopods must have originated in lineages derived from forms lacking eye development (Salvini-Plawen and Mayr, 1977). In addition, there might not even have been a common ancestral metazoan photoreceptive field. The phylogenetic analysis of Salvini-Plawen and Mayr indicates that photoreceptor cells themselves may have evolved independently between 40 and 65 times during metazoan evolution. (Wilkins 2002: 166)

The only, or at least the simplest, way to reconcile this pattern with the equally unambiguous general role of Pax6 and its associated genes in eye development throughout the Bilateria is to posit shared genetic potential for development of eyes, even when the potential is not expressed. From this perspective, both the multiple independent occurrence of certain traits in different related lineages (cases of “parallelism”) and the reacquisition of a particular trait in a lineage that had seemingly lost it (a “reversal”) can, in principle, be accommodated. The key is the retention of genes and genetic architectures within those lineages and their suppression or revocation through certain genetic changes (Simpson, 1983; Wake, 1991; Butler and Saidel, 2000). Loss-of-function mutations that abrogate the operation of networks are easy to imagine. Similarly, suppression of the effects of such mutations, leading to a restoration of the network’ functions, can also be readily envisaged. In this conceptual framework, the widespread usage of Pax6 and its associated network of genes is a significant fact, while the polyphyletic pattern of eye development drawn by Salvini-Plawen and Mayr is not dismissed, but can be interpreted as reflecting losses and gains of the use of this network. (Wilkins 2002: 167)

Altogether, these considerations require some changes in the ways in which we view, and use, the term “homology.” The basic concept of shared possession of a trait through common descent remains intact, but the idea that the “same” trait in two different organisms may actually exhibit more points of visible difference than of discernible identity seems counterintuitive, to put it mildly. Nevertheless, the idea that homologous morphological traits and genes need not share tight, invariant relationships had been anticipated long ago by de Beer (1938, 1958, 1971) …. In effect, a set of decoupled relationships would involve the sharing of part of the same regulatory circuitry, but without visible (morphological) homology being involved. As Fernald (2000) has expressed it:

Recently, the discovery of conservation of many of the genes used during ontogeny of the eye, particularly Pax6, has led to the proposal that all eyes are monophyletic that is, they arose from an “Ur” eye. However, our current level of understanding of the genetic control of eye development does not support this conclusion. Instead, there appears to be a continuity of genetic information that regulates the development of similar but nonhomologous eyes.

Perhaps, however, it is the traditional framework that needs reevaluation. In cladistic terms, a homologous trait is a synapomorphy. If morphological similarity is not a reliable guide to homologous relationships, what precisely would such a snyapomorphy consist of? In light of the material presented here, one can suggest that it would be a combination of shared key genes (one or more) plus a shared biological or developmental function for which those genes are crucial. This is a rather radical revision of the concept of homology, which for 150 years has been tied to visible similarity, and which has specifically disavowed shared function as a criterion of homology. The formulation put forward here, however, allows one to incorporate the observations on conserved key regulatory genes without invoking convergent evolution, and it preserves the basic idea of homology as “continuity of [genetic] information.” Davidson (2001, p. 201) has reached a similar position. In his words, when it comes to assessing homologous relationships, “seeing is not [necessarily] believing.” (Wilkins 2002: 167)

From this perspective, the eyes of insects and vertebrates are homologous, even though they look different from each other, develop differently, and may have arisen independently in separate lineages from ancestors lacking eyes. What they share is the inherited regulatory machinery and the ancestral use (function) of that machinery dating to early in metazoan evolutionary history for light sensing or some rudimentary form of vision. (Wilkins 2002: 16

~ ~ ~

18 Writing a few years afterward, Ernst Mayr captured the mood on the century of The Origin: “Symposia and conferences were held all over the world in 1959 in honor of the Darwin centennial, and were attended by all the leading students of evolution. If we read the volumes resulting from these meetings at Cold Spring Harbor, Chicago, Philadelphia, London, Gottingen, Singapore, and Melbourne, we are almost startled at the complete unanimity in the interpretation of evolution presented by the participants. Nothing could show more clearly how internally consistent and firmly established the synthetic theory is.” (Mayr, 1963, p.8)

Machine Dreams

If the emergentist-materialist ontology underlying biology (and, as a matter of fact, all the factual sciences) is correct, the bios constitutes a distinct ontic level the entities in which are characterized by emergent properties. The properties of biotic systems are then not (ontologically) reducible to the properties of their components, although we may be able to partially explain and predict them from the properties of their components… The belief that one has reduced a system by exhibiting [for instance] its components, which is indeed nothing but physical and chemical, is insufficient: physics and chemistry do not account for the structure, in particular the organization, of biosystems and their emergent properties (Mahner and Bunge 1997: 197). (Robert 2004: 132)

Sarkar (1998; Gilbert and Sarkar 2000) makes a helpful distinction between two kinds of reductionism — genetic reductionism and physical reductionism. Physical reductionism sees physics as the most basic of the sciences and holds that all scientific explanations may (and should) eventually be recast in the terms of physics; genetic reductionism holds that ‘genes can explain all phenotypic features of an organism’ (Sarkar 1998: 174). These types of reductionism are not coextensive, though both champions and critics of reductionism tend to conflate these two varieties; but whereas physical reductionism is a thesis about relations between the sciences, genetic reductionism is a thesis about the role of genes in organismal development. Both varieties of reductionism may be problematic, though for different reasons. (Robert 2004, 136)

Robert, Jason Scott (2004) Embryology, Epigenesis, and Evolution: Taking Development Seriously. Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Biology.

If one starts from the axiom-premise organisms are complex machines (which within certain limits I have no problem with) and the economy is merely a network of automata functioning like an automata one can rather easily develop mathematically tractable models. But these models hide the real world political and social dimensions of business and economics. Economies are more like organisms than machines. And more importantly one organism in particular, the human organism, including our ability to create other machines, systems, institutions, political and social structures, norms, and practices which allow us to modify physical, social, and even intellectual reality. Through our intelligent use of our minds and bodies we create other mechanisms, physical and social (living) relationships. These have their own levels of appropriate analysis. Social science, like biology, cannot be reduced to chemistry and physics. Neither can it be reduced to genetic algorithms or computational rules. Social science cannot be reduced to a natural science via some yet-to-be-discovered social mathematics. Human beings are not just more complex social insects. These are machine dreams or more to the point machine delusions rooted in a form of scientism.

THE GENE MYTH is not just a myth about genes. It is a story about the nature of the organism and the character of biological explanation. Inspired by our experience with machines, the story (in one of its versions) is narrated in a language of causal analysis, where some things make other things happen, and our investigation of a collection of parts, one by one, enables us to piece together a knowledge of the integrated whole. The continual elucidation of explanatory “mechanisms” has seemed to vindicate the story, supported further by promises of a better life for humans and a steady stream of stunning technical achievements in data gathering and manipulation of organisms. It is no wonder that the Human Genome Project aroused such high expectations.

But this story has now come to the end of its useful life. The loss of the gene at the head of a chain of causal mechanisms explaining the organism represents more than the loss of the master link in the chain. It exemplifies the failure of every link considered as machinelike. The seeming chaos of causal arrows now being documented under the heading of “gene regulation” repeats itself in every aspect of the cell. Researchers dutifully trying to follow arrows of causation end up chasing hares running in all directions. Is there any subdiscipline of molecular biology today where research has been reducing cellular processes to a more clearly defined set of causal relations instead of rendering them more ambiguous, more plastic and context dependent, and less mechanical? Consider a few examples. (Talbot 2013, 51) [And here the interesting part begins …]

Stephen L. Talbott (2013) The Myth of the Machine-Organism: From Genetic Mechanisms to Living Beings. In Genetic Explanations: Sense and Nonsense.

Epigenetic Algorithms

Mechanical metaphors have appealed to many philosophers who sought materialist explanations of life. The definitive work on this subject is T. S. Hall’s Ideas of Life and Matter (1969). Descartes, though a dualist, thought of animal bodies as automata that obeyed mechanical rules. Julien de la Mettrie applied stricter mechanistic principles to humans in L’Homme machine (1748). Clockwork and heat engine models were popular during the Industrial Revolution. Lamarck proposed hydraulic processes as causes of variation. In the late nineteenth century, the embryologists Wilhelm His and Wilhelm Roux theorized about developmental mechanics. However, as biochemical and then molecular biological information expanded, popular machine models were refuted, but it is not surprising that computers should have filled the gap. Algorithms that systematically provide instructions for a progressive sequence of events seem to be suitable analogues for epigenetic procedures. (Reid 2007: 263)

A common error in applying this analogy is the belief that the genetic code, or at least the total complement of an organism’s DNA contains the program for its own differential expression. In the computer age it is easy to fall into that metaphysical trap. However, in the computer age we should also know that algorithms are the creations of programmers. As Charles Babbage (1838) and Robert Chambers (1844) tried to tell us, the analogy is more relevant to creationism than evolutionism. At the risk of offending the sophisticates who have indulged me so far, I want to state the problems in the most simple terms. To me, that is a major goal of theoretical biology, rather than the conversion of life to mathematics. (Reid 2007: 263)

Reid, Robert G.B. (2007) Biological Emergences: Evolution by Natural Experiment. Vienna Series in Theoretical Biology.

More attention to the history of Science is needed, as much by scientists as by historians, and especially by biologists, and this means a deliberate attempt to understand the thoughts of the great masters of the past, to see in what circumstances or intellectual milieu their ideas were formed, where they took the wrong turning or stopped short on the right track. (R. A. Fisher, 1959)

Wilkins, Adam S. (2002) The Evolution of Developmental Pathways

Because the great controversies of the past often reach into modern science, many current arguments cannot be fully understood unless one understands their history. ERNST MAYR 1982, 1

McCloskey, Deirdre Nansen; Ziliak, Steve. The Cult of Statistical Significance (Economics, Cognition, And Society) (Kindle Locations 2036-2038). University of Michigan Press.

As the relations between development and evolution were explored in the last decades of the twentieth century, mutations in those genes that regulate development also assumed great significance. Regulatory (homeobox) genes were reported that affected whole sets of genes, and some paleontologists [and developmental geneticists, etc.] have emphasized that mutations in such regulatory genes result in large discontinuous evolutionary changes (a reshuffling of parts) and may be a macromechanism of evolution. But symbiosis–the inheritance of acquired genomes, wholes or parts–was trivialized or ignored by paleontologists. Gould himself regarded the symbiotic origin of mitochondria and chloroplasts as “entering the quirky and incidental side” of evolution. (Sapp 2003: 250-251)

Most of the great controversies and conceptual oppositions of the nineteenth century are still present at the beginning of the twenty-first century: religion and vitalism versus evolution and materialism, structuralism versus functionalism, reductionism versus holism, gradualism versus saltationism, selectionism versus nonadaptationism, the inheritance of acquired characteristics, and nurture versus nature. What has changed is not so much the nature of the ideas but the evidence supporting them and the intensity of the debates. (Sapp 2003: 267)

Jan Sapp (2003) Genesis: The Evolution of Biology

Conceptualizing Cells

We should all take seriously an assessment of biology made by the physicist David Bohm over 30 years ago (and universally ignored):

“It does seem odd … that just when physics is … moving away from mechanism, biology and psychology are moving closer to it. If the trend continues … scientists will be regarding living and intelligent beings as mechanical, while they suppose that inanimate matter is to complex and subtle to fit into the limited categories of mechanism.” [D. Bohm, “Some Remarks on the Notion of Order,” in C. H. Waddington, ed., Towards a Theoretical Biology: 2 Sketches. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Press 1969), p. 18-40.]

The organism is not a machine! Machines are not made of parts that continually turn over and renew; the cell is. A machine is stable because its parts are strongly built and function reliably. The cell is stable for an entirely different reason: It is homeostatic. Perturbed, the cell automatically seeks to reconstitute its inherent pattern. Homeostasis and homeorhesis are basic to all living things, but not machines.

If not a machine, then what is the cell?

— Carl R. Woese (2005, 100) on Evolving Biological Organization

DECONSTRUCTING MARGINALIST MICROECONOMICS

What is the essence of homo economicus? Homo economicus is a man in search of pleasure. He is man who knows what he wants and how to get it. There are fixed limits on what homo economicus can obtain, but he is a master of getting the best that he can from within those limits. The term was first coined as a criticism. It would seem that when certain people in the nineteenth century read the famous economist and philosopher John Stuart Mill, they did not like what they found. They accused Mill of reducing the human being to nothing but a calculator of his immediate pleasures. They said that Mill had removed anything properly human from Man and replaced him instead with some sort of amoral robot [e.g., automaton]; this robot they called homo economicus (Persky 1995). (Pilkington 2016, 71)

Mill himself was quite explicit about what he was doing. He claimed that economics—which was then called ‘political economy’—was concerned only with certain specific facets of Man’s existence. It did not poach on the preserves of other moral disciplines but rather abstracted from them and reasoned as if they did not exist. Mill wrote:

[Political economy] does not treat of the whole of man’s nature as modified by the social state, nor of the whole conduct of man in society. It is concerned with him solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of judging of the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end. It predicts only such phenomena of the social state as take place in consequence of the pursuit of wealth. It makes entire abstraction of every other human passion or motive; except those which may be regarded as perpetually antagonizing principles to the desire of wealth, namely, aversion to labor, and desire of the present enjoyment of costly indulgences … Political economy considers mankind as occupied solely in acquiring and consuming wealth; and aims at showing what is the course of action into which mankind, living in a state of society, would be impelled, if that motive, except in the degree in which it is checked by the two perpetual counter-motives above adverted to, were absolute ruler of all their actions. (Mill 1844) (Pilkington 2016, 71-72)

What concerned those who criticised Mill’s homo economicus was that it highlighted some of what they considered to be the less seemly aspects of Man’s existence. This was the age of high morality, and Mill’s construction seemed to many to be against the morality of the day. This was also an age of mass wealth accumulation, and Mill’s construction probably showed up a certain truth that some were less than pleased to deal with as it ran contrary to what they considered good behavior. (Pilkington 2016, 72)

By the mid- to late twentieth century, mass consumption had become a way of life and contemporary morality was more accommodative to the homo economicus. Indeed, today he seems like a rather natural construction in an age where people constitute their lives through accumulation and consumption. He has also been given more precision. Today, following on from the work of the early marginalists, he is modelled using indifference curves and differential calculus. To a critic of the theory, it is less the morality that stands out as it is the image of Man that is put forward. Man is seen as a sort of automaton with fixed, ordered preferences [or “if-then” rules as envisioned by genetic algorithms], a vast capacity for information that would be the envy of even the most powerful of computers. Whereas yesteryear homo economicus seemed offensively amoral, today he seems offensively unrealistic. (Pilkington 2016, 72, bold added)

The fact of this matter cannot be overstated enough If we turn, for example, to the main macroeconomic model used by the European Central Bank at the time of writing, we find it populated with a plethora of homo economicus. In their key forecasting model which is supposed to represent the Eurozone economy, they write:

Each household h maximises its lifetime utility in a given period t by choosing purchases of the consumption good, Ch,t, purchases of the investment good, Ih,t. (Christoffel et. al. 2008, p. 11)

Thus they turn every household into a homo economicus and then lump these homo economicus together and spell out their exact behaviour in a series of equations. If the assumption that each household acts like a homo economicus can be shown to be nonsense, then the findings of the model will also be nonsense. This cannot be stressed enough: this assumption is at the absolute core of many ‘very serious’ theories; without it they literally cannot function. Yet if the construction can be shown to be false, and by that I mean if it can be shown not to be a reasonable approximation of the real object of study (economic agents), then the theories themselves must also be false and central banks can be shown to be wasting an awful lot of time and resources employing people to build such theories. (Pilkington 2016, 73)

Galileo Goes to Jail

Falsehood is not a matter of narration technique but something premeditated as a perversion of truth…. The shadow of a hair’s turning, premeditated for an untrue purpose, the slightest twisting or perversion of that which is principle—these constitute falseness. But the fetish of factualized truth, fossilized truth, the iron band of so-called unchanging truth, holds one blindly in a closed circle of cold fact. One can be technically right as to fact and everlastingly wrong in the truth. (Urantia Book 48:6.33)

~ ~ ~

Among some astronomers and even more astrologers, Copernicus’ claim won converts. But in 1615, the Roman Catholic Church declared the idea a heresy and in 1632 condemned the scientist Galileo Galilei to life in prison for disseminating it.
— Ken Zimmerman, RWER : More on what’s missing, 9/1/2020

[T]he great Galileo, at the age of fourscore, groaned away his days in the dungeons of the Inquisition, because he had demonstrated by irrefragable proofs the motion of the earth.
— Voltaire, “Descartes and Newton” (1728)

[T]he celebrated Galileo … was put in the inquisition for six years, and put to the torture, for saying, that the earth moved.

— Giuseppe Baretti, The Italian Library (1757)

[T]o say that Galileo was tortured is not a reckless claim, but it is simply to repeat what the sentence says. To specify that he was tortured about his intention is not a risky deduction, but it is, again, to report what that text says. These are observation-reports, reports, not magical intuitions; proved facts, not cabalistic introspections.

— Italo Mereu, History of Intolerance in Europe (1979)

The trial ended on June 22, 1633, with a harsher sentence than Galileo had been led to expect. The verdict found him guilty of a category of heresy intermediate between the most and the least serious, called “vehement suspicion of heresy.” The objectionable beliefs were the astronomical thesis that the earth moves and the methodological principle that the Bible is not a scientific authority. He was forced to recite a humiliating “abjuration” retracting these beliefs. But the Dialogue was banned. (Galileo Goes to Jail and Other Myths about Science and Religion (Kindle Locations 757-760). Kindle Edition.)

The lengthy sentencing document also recounted the proceedings since 1613, summarized the 1633 charges, and noted Galileo’s defense and confession. In addition, it provided two other extremely important details. The first described an interrogation: “Because we did not think you had said the whole truth about your intention, we deemed it necessary to proceed against you by a rigorous examination. Here you answered in a Catholic manner, though without prejudice to the above-mentioned things confessed by you and deduced against you about your intention.” The second imposed an additional penalty: “We condemn you to formal imprisonment in this Holy Office at our pleasure.” (Kindle Locations 760-764)

The lengthy sentencing document also recounted the proceedings since 1613, summarized the 1633 charges, and noted Galileo’s defense and confession. (….) The text of the Inquisition’s sentence and Galileo’s abjuration were the only trial documents publicized at the time. Indeed, the Inquisition sent copies to all provincial inquisitors and papal nuncios, requesting them to disseminate the information. Thus news of Galileo’s fate circulated widely in books, newspapers, and one-page flyers. This unprecedented publicity resulted from the express orders of Pope Urban, who wanted Galileo’s case to serve as a negative lesson to all Catholics and to strengthen his own image as an intransigent defender of the faith. (Kindle Locations 760-767)

(….) The impression that Galileo had been imprisoned and tortured remained plausible as long as the principal evidence available about Galileo’s trial came from these documents, the sentence and abjuration. The story remained unchanged until—after about 150 years for the prison thesis and about 250 years for the torture thesis—relevant documents came to light showing that Galileo had suffered neither. (Galileo Goes to Jail and Other Myths about Science and Religion (Kindle Locations 775-777). Kindle Edition.)

The new information about imprisonment comes from correspondence in 1633, primarily from the Tuscan ambassador to Rome (Francesco Niccolini) to the Tuscan secretary of state in Florence, and secondarily that to and from Galileo himself. The Tuscan officials were especially interested in Galileo because he was employed as the chief mathematician and philosopher to the grand duke of Tuscany, had dedicated the Dialogue to him, and had successfully sought his help in publishing the book in Florence. Thus the Tuscan government treated the trial like an affair of state, with Niccolini constantly discussing the situation directly with the pope at their regular meetings and sending reports to Florence. Moreover, Galileo was on very friendly terms with Niccolini and his wife. (Kindle Locations 777-781)

(….) With the possible exception of three days (June 21-24, 1633), Galileo was never held in prison, either during the trial (as was universal custom) or afterward (as the sentence decreed). Even for those three days he likely lodged in the prosecutor’s apartment, not in a cell. The explanation for such unprecedentedly benign treatment is not completely clear but includes the following factors: the protection of the Medici, Galileo’s celebrity status, and the love-hate attitude of Pope Urban, an erstwhile admirer. (Kindle Locations 792-795)

(….) In view of the available evidence, the most tenable position is that Galileo underwent an interrogation with the threat of torture but did not undergo actual torture or even territio realis. Although he remained under house arrest during the 1633 trial and for the subsequent nine years of his life, he never went to prison. We should keep in mind, however, that for 150 years after the trial the publicly available evidence indicated that Galileo had been imprisoned, and for 250 years the evidence indicated that he had been tortured. The myths of Galileo’s torture and imprisonment are thus genuine myths: ideas that are in fact false but once seemed true—and continue to be accepted as true by poorly educated persons and careless scholars. (Kindle Locations 839-843)

~ ~ ~

Simple stories are poor vehicles for complex nuanced historical truth. The Catholic Church like all human institutions — is full of justifiable blame for the errors of evil and sin, even iniquity, but let the blame be laid on firm evidentiary foundations and not half-truths of simple stories careless with fact and truth, lest we be guilty of twisting hairs and casting shadows of half-truth for untrue purposes.

Nextdoor Eliminationism

In 1950, McCarthy gave a routine speech at an obscure forum in Wheeling, West Virginia, in which, according to audience members, he claimed:

I have here in my hand a list of 205 … a list of names that were made known to the secretary of state as being members of the Communist Party and who nevertheless are still working and shaping policy in the State Department.

McCarthy possessed no such list and apparently made up the number 205, which changed with further iterations. But no matter. McCarthy had struck a match in a political climate that was saturated with the fumes of suspicion and fear, and in the media explosion that followed he became the most famous man in the country. Over the next several years, he falsely accused numerous people—government officials, journalists, Hollywood writers, lawyers, professors—of espionage and communist associations. McCarthy did not possess any solid information that any of them were communists, just rumor and innuendo that had long ago been checked out by the FBI and other government agencies. In a series of committee hearings, he and his colleagues bullied, smeared, and humiliated a long line of witnesses—none of whom was ever convicted of a crime in a court, but many of whom lost their jobs because of skittish employers. Hollywood screenwriters drawn into the net were blacklisted.

Posner (2020, 195-196) The Demagogue’s Playbook.

The social media site Nextdoor has implemented a Good Neighbor Pledge. The evidence above in which Nextdoor user Brandon Kask posts without a shred of evidence of who said what when and where accuses collectively the Black Lives Matter movement, protesters, his neighbors, and elected officials of being part of a “communist” conspiratorial plot to bring about a “coup” simply by changing the sheriff’s position from an elected position to an appointed position. As with all hate speech, it is meant to incite others to follow on and amplify the malicious hate rhetoric that is meant to result in elimination of those who are targeted. It is not meant to foster intelligent discussion of informed citizens, but merely to demonize the “other” through hate speech rooted in fear mongering, racist and eliminationist rhetoric exhibited in Scott Neiman’s response in which he refers to those who hold a different view on the issues as being followers of “leftism,” “extreme leftism,” “commie’s,” and advocating “authoritarianism.” These are examples, detailed below, of eliminationism and eliminationist rhetoric a form of hyper-partisan political hate speech.

Is calling someone a “puke” neighborly?

It is clear that Nextdoor has no intention of fulfilling its phony Good Neighbor Pledge. It is the same cast of characters, like Greg Robel, who engage in debased and degenerate form of demeaning communication to others on Nexdoor’s platform. And when such hate filled bile is posted on Nextdoor and it is reported (as Robel was) it sits there despite Nextdoor claiming that such hateful rhetoric has no place on its platform.

Bad social media platforms (e.g., Nextdoor) need nothing more to compass their ends, than that good men and women (aka paid employees of ND) should look on and do nothing, or worse, publish greenwashed falsehoods while bile is still pumped into our social fabric.

— John Stuart Mill, Updated for Modernity

This is evidenced in the fact that Nextdoor relies on volunteer moderators that are so incompetent that they remove Scott Neiman’s hateful eliminationist rhetoric but leave Brandon Kask’s original eliminationist hate speech that makes baseless accusations without a shred of evidence aimed at anyone who holds a view different from his own that they are communists part of a communist plot to bring about a coup. How ludicrous considering the issue would be voted on and only implemented if passed by a majority, a very democratic thing to do and which alone refutes this hateful rhetoric.

The fallacious absurdity of Brandon Kask’s claims is evidenced in the history of King County Council itself. The post of sheriff was changed from an elective position to an appointed position in 1968 and then back to an elective position in 1996 all by a democratic process of free and fair elections just as this initiative too will be decided. (See King County — Thumbnail History)

Brandon Kask and Scott Neiman are through their words revealing they are intellectual parrots of AM Hate Radio and the rhetoric of eliminationism that has been pumped into American minds over the last thirty years of a fratricidal culture war that eschews intellectual political discussions grounded in mutual respect of one’s neighbors and restrained by reason and logic and evidence. That Nextdoor allows such hate speech to pass as civil reveals how dangerous it is as a social media platform, not unlike Twitter or Facebook, in that it allows toxic hateful messages to pass as neighborly conduct when it is anything but neighborly to call, without evidence or proof, one’s neighbors, one’s elected officials, and entire groups of people “communist.”

Brandon Kask and Scott Neiman (and since it is allowed to pass as “neighborly” discussion, Nextdoor too) are no different than the Nazis who used hateful and malicious false labels of those they viewed as the “enemy” and didn’t agree with politically to demonize them and thereby make them the target of group hate. This is exactly how the Nazi’s used anti-Semitism:

The Nazis equated all opposition movements—socialist, liberal, communist, humanitarian, cosmopolitan, individualist, democratic—to the Jewish cabal. (Tsesis 2002, 24)

The truth and facts have absolutely no place in Kask’s and Neiman’s rhetoric. Its purpose is to incite hatred and nothing more. And Nextdoor as a social media platform amplifies such hateful rhetoric and undermines our neighborhood’s social fabric by treating such as good neighborly forms of communication when it is anything but good for our social well being. Such rhetoric as Kask and Neiman post is a form of prejudice and scapegoating perpetrated through hateful stereotypes.

Stereotypes may be words specially formulated for disparaging a particular group or may simply be natural language expressions that channel hatred against an outgroup. These communications are geared toward representing the victims as objects of derision and designating a course of action against them—be it judicial unfairness or job discrimination. In Kantian terms, stereotypes are schemas for memory, retrieval, evaluation, and understanding. Concepts assigned to outgroups, such as lasciviousness, greed, immorality, and infidelity, become integral parts of vernacular descriptions and imaginings about them. Stereotyping eases the processing of information because it furnishes an already established scheme for compartmentalizing sense stimuli. After having been exposed to negative images of blacks, people are more likely to anticipate that blacks are dangerous. Completely innocuous events—for example, a black man approaching in the middle of the street at night—are often interpreted as perilous even when no factual reason for fear or added anxiety exists. The event may be recorded in the memory as having been a hazardous situation even though no evidence substantiates such a conclusion. (Tsesis 2002, 87-88)

Prejudices are means for convincing oneself why it is appropriate to act in ways that contradict basic ethical standards against inflicting harm. They are instrumental for excusing behavior that undermines the underlying structure of well-ordered society. Supremacism has profound consequences both when opportunities to discriminate are present and in conditioning sentiments that can be conducive for later unfairness. Ethnocentric people recognize that oppressive acts are not humane. So, derogatory images portraying outgroups as inferiors help them dismiss the notion that the others are by nature worthy of compassionate treatment, too. A violation of ethical norms is easier to explain away if the victims belong to an outgroup and are widely portrayed as demonic adversaries who are purportedly menacing to the population. (Tsesis 2002, 91)

In July of 2008, a graying, mustachioed man from the Knoxville suburb of Powell, Tennessee, sat down and wrote out by hand a four-page manifesto describing his hatred of all things liberal and his belief that “all liberals should be killed.” (Neiwert 2016, 1)

When he was done, Jim David Adkisson drove his little Ford Escape to the parking lot of the Tennessee Valley Unitarian Universalist Church in Knoxville. A few days before, the church had attracted media attention for its efforts to open a local coffee shop for gays and lesbians. Leaving the manifesto on the seat of the car, he walked inside the church carrying a guitar case stuffed with a shotgun and 76 rounds of ammunition. (Neiwert 2016, 1)

The congregants were enjoying the opening scene from the church’s production of the musical Annie Jr. when Adkisson, in a hallway outside the sanctuary, abruptly opened the guitar case, pulled out the shotgun, fired off a harmless round that startled everyone, then walked into the sanctuary and began firing indiscriminately. Witnesses report he was saying “hateful things.” An unsuspecting 61-year-old grandmother and retired schoolteacher named Linda Kraeger was hit in the face with a shotgun blast. A 60-year-old foster father named Greg McKendry got up to shield others from the attack and was hit in the chest. (Neiwert 2016, 1-2)

(….) A detective who interviewed Adkisson and examined his four-page manifesto reported to his superiors that Adkisson targeted the church “because of its liberal teachings and his belief that all liberals should be killed because they were ruining the country, and that he felt that the Democrats had tied his country’s hands in the war on terror and they had ruined every institution in America with the aid of media outlets.” (Neiwert 2016, 2)

When the detective interviewed Adkisson, he said he’d decided that since “he could not get to the leaders of the liberal movement that he would then target those that had voted them in to office.” (Neiwert 2016, 2)

Knoxville’s police chief told reporters the next day that Adkisson was motivated by his “hatred of the liberal movement” and “liberals in general, as well as gays.” He was also frustrated by his inability to get a job, a problem he also blamed on liberals. His neighbors in Powell described Adkisson as “a Confederate” and a “believer in the Old South.” (Neiwert 2016, 2-3)

When detectives went to Adkisson’s home in Powell, they found—scattered among the ammunition, guns, and brass knuckles—books written by leading conservative pundits: Liberalism Is a Mental Disorder by Michael Savage, Let Freedom Ring by Sean Hannity, and The O’Reilly Factor by Bill O’Reilly, among others. Adkisson’s manifesto, released some months later to the public, was largely a distillation of these works, ranting about how “Liberals have attack’d every major institution that made America great. … Liberals are evil, they embrace the tenets of Karl Marx, they’re Marxist, socialist, communists.” (Neiwert 2016, 3)

(….) The events that sunny Sunday left the church’s pastor, Rev. Chris Buice, with a shattered congregation. “People were killed in the sanctuary of my church, which should be the holy place, the safe place. People were injured,” he told PBS’s Rick Karr a couple of weeks later. “A man came in here, totally dehumanized us—members of our church were not human to him. Where did he get that? Where did he get that sense that we were not human?” (Neiwert 2016, 4)

Such incidents—the nasty personal encounters, the ugliness at campaign rallies, the violent acts of “lone wolf” gunmen—are anything but rare. If you’re a liberal in America—or for that matter, anyone who happens to have run afoul of the conservative movement and its followers—you probably have similar tales to tell about unexpected and brutal viciousness from otherwise ordinary, everyday people, nearly all of them political conservatives, nearly all directed at their various enemies: liberals, Latinos, Muslims, and just about anyone who disagrees with them.

What motivates this kind of talk and behavior is called eliminationism: a politics and a culture that shuns dialogue and the democratic exchange of ideas in favor of the pursuit of outright elimination of the opposing side, either through suppression, exile, and ejection, or extermination.

Rhetorically, eliminationism takes on certain distinctive shapes. It always depicts its opposition as beyond the pale, the embodiment of evil itself, unfit for participation in their vision of society, and thus worthy of elimination. It often further depicts its designated Enemy as vermin (especially rats and cockroaches) or diseases, and disease-like cancers on the body politic. A close corollary—but not as nakedly eliminationist—is the claim that opponents are traitors or criminals and that they pose a threat to our national security.

Eliminationism is often voiced as crude “jokes,” a sense of humor inevitably predicated on venomous hatred. And such rhetoric—we know as surely as we know that night follows day—eventually begets action, with inevitably tragic results.

Two key factors distinguish eliminationist rhetoric from other political hyperbole:

1. It is focused on an enemy within, people who constitute entire blocs of the citizen populace.
2. It advocates the excision and extermination of those entire blocs by violent or civil means.

(….) Eliminationism—including the rhetoric that precedes it and fuels it—expresses a kind of self-hatred. In an American culture that advertises itself as predicated on equal opportunity, eliminationism runs precisely counter to those ideals. Eliminationists, at heart, hate the very idea of an inclusive America.

— David Neiwert (2009, 11-12) The Eliminationists: How Hate Talk Radicalized the American Right. Routledge.

In Guns We Trust

This extremist right-wing evangelical fundamentalist religion is on full display in many glossy gun magazines. Next to a picture of a wooden cross and Charlie Daniels standing between Marty and Cindy Daniel proudly displaying their Daniel’s Defense AR-15, is written, “Faith, family and firearms—the important things in life (Marty & Cindy Daniel. The Fiddler’s Firearm. USA: Guns & Ammo; 2017 Mar.).” As writer Warren Cassidy of the NRA told Osha Gray Davidson,

You would get a better understanding if you approached us as if you were approaching one of the great religions of the world. — Bellesiles 2000, 7, In Davidson, Under Fire, 44; Guns & Ammo, November 1998, 64-78

The further away we get from God, the worse off we get. Raise up a child the way it should go, and when he is older he won’t depart from it. There is no discipline today…. A child is very blessed to have a disciplinarian family. I was raised in a disciplinarian home. My mama could use a switch like an Olympic fencer. Charlie Daniels Interview, The Fiddler’s Firearm, Guns & Ammo, March 30, 2017.

Beating one’s children is considered discipline within this twisted culture of biblicist evangelical Christian fundamentalism. It is important that we understand the true nature and extent of the religious right’s culture war. This is not just an extremist movement preaching a gun-rights theology, but it’s intricately bound up with both religious fundamentalism, market fundamentalism, and political extremism. Racism, Islamophobia, Xenophobia, White Supremacist and Christian Nationalism go hand in hand with this twisted gospel of paranoid fear based evangelical fundamentalism. Within this fundamentalist culture black lives simply don’t matter:

The problems people have with police could be avoided if they would just do what the officer told them to do. If the officer says put your hands on the hood, then put your hands on the hood. If the officer tells ya to get out of the car, then get out of the car. [If an] officer tells you he wants to see your driver’s license and registration card, very gingerly take them out. That is all you have to do. And, basically, all they are going to do is their job…. People escalate these things into problems, and it ends up being a shooting match. You cannot blame a policeman for protecting his life.

— Charlie Daniels Interview, The Fiddler’s Firearm, Guns & Ammo, March 30, 2017.

It is hard to see how a black man lying on the ground with a police officer’s knee on his neck is a “shooting match.” It is hard to see how a black man when asked to show his license and registration by a police officer and is then shot to death while trying to comply with the officer’s request is a “shooting match.” It is even harder to imagine how Daniels can view a police officer shooting in the back a fleeing black man as a “shooting match” without recognizing the blatant racism. Charlie Daniels reveals the callousness of white racism in that he is deaf, dumb, and blind to the fundamental problem of racism in America. Instead, he blames the victims excusing any and all behavior and accountability of the police brutality regardless of how negligent or out right racist and malicious the violence perpetrated against blacks. Charlie Daniels words are witness to the depth of racism in America today and the entire world sees what Charlie Daniels is a willfully ignorant racist when he turns a deaf, dumb, and blind eye to police brutality against black men, women, and children while blaming the many victims.

Cosmic Child Abuse

I don’t judge you. I leave that to a wrathful, angry God to do.

— Ned Flanders to his wayward neighbor, Homer Simpson

“The Cross isn’t a form of cosmic child abuse — a vengeful Father, punishing his Son for an offense he has not even committed. Understandably, both people inside and outside of the Church have found this twisted version of events morally dubious and a huge barrier to faith.”

When I penned this statement, as part of the text of The Lost Message of Jesus, I had no idea of the debate that it would ignite or the controversy it would stir…. Though the sheer bluntness of my imagery shocked some, I contend that, in truth, it represents nothing more than a stark unmasking of what I understand to be the violent, pre-Christian thinking behind the popular theory of penal substitutionary atonement … [that] I readily concede, is currently regarded as orthodoxy within modern evangelicalism…. I believe it to be biblically, culturally and pastorally deficient and even dangerous. (Chalke 2008: 34-35)

(….) I grieve over the depth of the damage that has been, and is being, done through the distortion, misrepresentation and misunderstanding of the purpose of the cross under the label of “penal” substitution…. N.T. [Wright] states, for instance, “it … is deeply, profoundly, and disturbingly unbiblical.” In my opinion, he is right once more…. I believe it is better to abandon the use of the term [“penal” substitution] altogether and restate the truth in fresh ways. (Chalke 2008: 35)

(….) Inadequate doctrines of atonement lead to distorted understandings of God and humanity and result in an immature engagement in community and wider society.

But if erroneous theology leads to dysfunctional missiology, is there any connection between the public’s almost universal perception of certain elements of the church as judgmental, guilt-inducing, censorious, finger-wagging, bigoted, and self-righteous and aspects of its theology of the cross? And if, as historian and scholar David Bebbington claims, one of the four pillars of evangelicalism (which together are known as the Bebbington Quadrilateral) is “crucicentrism”, or cross-centredness, why is it that our culture now views the death of Christ as no more than some kind of ancient myth or irrelevant religious event? Perhaps one factor is that our thinking about the cross has become distorted and thus our presentation of it is inadequate to engage the hearts and minds of our contemporaries both within and beyond the church. (Chalke 2008: 36)

(….) Though often represented as a much older formulation, penal substitutionary theory, as it is understood and taught in many evangelical churches today, rests largely on the work of the nineteenth-century American theologian Charles Hodge, who, building on the work of John Calvin’s legal mind, argued that a righteous God is angry with sinners and demands justice. God’s wrath can be appeased only through bringing about the violent death of his Son. Joel Green and Mark Baker demonstrate in their book, Rediscovering the Scandal of the Cross, that, whereas supporters of penal substitutionary theory tend to quote the writings of various church fathers and early Christian writers to bolster their claims, their conclusion is more easily understood as an anachronistic “reading back” of modern views onto ancient texts, particularly into the work of Anselm of Canterbury. (Chalke 2008: 37)

(….) However, the supposed orthodoxy of penal substitution is greatly misleading. Although as a theory it is not as old as many people assume, it is actually built on pre-Christian thought. This is a point pressed by Professor George Eldon Ladd in A Theology of the New Testament: “In pagan Greek thought the gods often became angry with men, but their anger could be placated and the good will of the gods obtained by some kind of propitiatory sacrifice. Even in the Old Testament, the idea of atonement as the propitiating of an angry deity and transmuting his anger into benevolence is not to be found.” The emphasis on Yahweh’s apparent appetite for continuous appeasement through blood sacrifice, present in some Pentateuchal texts is to be understood in the light of later prophetic writings as a reflection of the worship practices of the pagan cults of the nations that surrounded the people of Israel. However, the story of Israel’s salvation is the story of her journey away from these primal practices towards a new and more enlightened understanding by way of Yahweh’s self-revelation. (Chalke 2008: 38)

(….) Indeed, one of the challenging questions for those who hold a penal substitutionary view of the atonement is the fact that Jewish prophets of the eighth century BCE were clearly already moving beyond this concept. Thus, to defend the theory of penal substitution by arguing the meaning of this or that isolated biblical text ignores a deeper truth. The resonance of the scriptural witness, the overall flow of the narrative, and the unravelling story of salvation all speak with a different voice. So it is that, today, even the most orthodox Jewish teaching and practice has long since abandoned blood sacrifice. There is simply no Jewish scholar anywhere in the world who understands the sum content of the Old Testament text as an ongoing demand for propitiatory blood sacrifice. (Chalke 2008: 39)

The greatest theological problem with penal substitution is that it presents us with a God who is first and foremost concerned with retribution for sin that flows from his wrath against sinners. The only way for his anger to be placated is in receiving recompense from those who have wronged him, and although his great love motivates him to send his Son, his wrath remains the driving force behind the need for the cross. (Chalke 2008: 39)

If we follow Hodge’s understanding of the atonement, it is Jesus’ death alone that becomes our “good news”. This approach reduces the whole gospel to a single sentence: “God is no longer angry with us because Jesus died in our place.” Indeed, that is exactly why evangelistic presentations based on penal substitution often do not even bother to mention the resurrection: for them, it serves no direct purpose in the story of salvation. (Chalke 2008: 39)

Ironically, what Hodge most neglected was to let Jesus speak for himself. It is difficult to see how penal substitution fits with the words or attitudes of Jesus. For instance, if the whole gospel centres on Jesus’ death, what was the good news he told his followers to preach (Luke 9:6) before the crucifixion? And if God needed to a sacrifice to placate his anger, how could Jesus forgive sins before his sacrifice had been made? In fact, why did Jesus preach at all? The rest of his ministry was ultimately unnecessary if it is only his death that makes things new. Surely we cannot embrace a theology in which Jesus’ entire thirty-three-year incarnation could be reduced to a long weekend’s activity. (Chalke 2008: 39)

It is interesting to note that in Jesus’ own explanations of his Father’s relationship with mankind, the story of the prodigal son, the father is not presented as angry or vengeful or as seeking justice and retribution; instead, he simply runs to greet his wayward child, showers him with gifts and welcomes him home (Luke 15:11-32). The father in the parable is wronged, but he chooses to forgive in order to restore a broken relationship there is no theme of retribution. Instead, the story is one of outstanding grace, of scandalous love and mercy. How different it would read if penal substitution were the model of atonement offered. (Chalke 2008: 39-40)

In addition, we can note Jesus’ teaching on anger (Matt. 5:22) and retaliation (Matt. 5:38-42). Is it not strange for Jesus (God incarnate) on the one hand to teach “do not return evil for evil” while still looking for retribution himself? Similarly, would it not be inconsistent for God to warn us not to be angry with each other and yet burn with wrath himself, or tell us to love our enemies when he obviously could not quite bring himself to do the same without demanding massive appeasement? If these things are true, what does it mean to “be perfect … as your heavenly Father is perfect” (Matt. 5:48)? If it is true that Jesus is “the Word of God”, then how can his message be inconsistent with his nature? If the cross has anything to do with penal substitution, then Jesus’ teaching becomes a divine case of “do as I say, not as I do.” I, for one, believe that God practices what he preaches. If the cross is a personal act of violence perpetrated by God towards humankind but borne by his Son, then it makes a mockery of Jesus’ own teaching to love your enemies and to refuse to repay evil with evil. (Chalke 2008: 40)

So, what of God’s anger? The most profound theological truth expressed in the whole of canon of Scripture is that “God is love” (1 John 4:8). The Bible never defines God as anger, power or judgment; in fact, it never defines him as anything other than love. Love is not a quality that God possess but rather is his divine essence itself his essential being. And more than that, the Bible never makes assertions about God’s anger, power or judgment independently of his love. God’s anger is an aspect of his love, and to understand it any differently is to misunderstand it. (Chalke 2008: 40)

Every father will be wronged by his children; it is a simple fact. All of us who know the joy of raising children also know the pain of their rebelliousness and yet no parent who loves their child ever seeks retribution for wrongs done to them. Parental anger, when it is motivated by genuine love, cannot be violent or destructive. Though in Scripture we read about God’s various attributes, in truth, they are never more than repetitions and amplifications of the one statement that God loves. The reality of God’s wrath is never in dispute. But only in light of our understanding of God as the perfect father can we begin to see that the objects of his burning anger are not his beloved children but the evils, attitudes and behaviours that ensnare and seek to destroy them. (Chalke 2008: 40)

(….) Penal substitutionary theory betrays Jesus’ attempt to root out the tendency of religion to lead to violence by inventing a theology of his death that is in direct opposition to his teaching. If the church could rediscover a deeper understanding of the cross, we could once again speak with prophetic power to a global society caught in the grip of the lie that violence can be redemptive. The church’s inability to shake off the great distortion of God contained in the theory of penal substitution, with its inbuilt belief in retribution and the redemptive power of violence, has cost us dearly. As the world struggles to find a way out of the chaos resulting from the doctrine of “might is right” and “he who has the biggest guns wins,” there is now an opportunity for the church to live out its commitment to the ethic of non-violence or “assertive meekness” demonstrated by Christ throughout his life and ultimately authenticated by his cross and resurrection. Jews, Muslims and Christians alike have to face up to the truth that their holy texts can be interpreted violently. Will our Christ-centered faith be part of the world’s answer or part of its problem? (Chalke 2008: 41)

But a commitment to penal substitution also raises other ethical concerns. Indeed, it is open to the charge that it does little more than reflect the nineteenth- and twentieth-century culturally dominant values of individualism, autonomy and consumerism. Thus, the primary purpose for the cross becomes its instant “cash value” for the individual. by “praying the prayer”, I am immediately moved from the wrong side of God’s legal ledger to the right side. The great transaction is done. And what is more, not only am I no longer guilty but I can also cling to the belief that “once saved, always saved”. My eternal destiny is guaranteed. Penal substitution offers instant forgiveness without challenging basic day-to-day moral behavior. It separates salvation from discipleship by disconnecting the way that Jesus lived his life from his saving work. (Chalke 2008: 41-42)

(….) “I don’t judge you. I leave that to a wrathful, angry God to do,” thunders Bible-thumping, churchgoing Ned Flanders to his wayward neighbor, Homer Simpson. Of course, many Christians learn to live with the dichotomy caused by an uncritical acceptance of penal substitutionary theory. On the one hand, they believe in God’s grace and goodness, but on the other, they believe that one of the central acts of their faith is bound upon in his vengeance and wrath. The only way they cope with this tension is to dismiss it as “a divine paradox”. However, for their friends and the rest of the world, it is simply a massive contradiction, the “elephant in the room”. (Chalke 2008: 42)

Since my book was published, and in the serious theological debate that has followed it, some have sought to readdress their definition of penal substitution. I have witnessed various attempts to redraw, redefine, recast, remodel and rehabilitate the theory as “not really as violent and retributive a concept as The Lost Message of Jesus suggested”…. [I]n my view, what we need is not a reworking [“penal substitution theory lite”] but a renunciation. Why? Because even the most sophisticated and gracious attempts to nuance penal substitution have, in the end, failed to communicate anything other than a distorted view of God at a popular level. (Chalke 2008: 42)

(….) On the cross, Jesus does not placate God’s anger in taking the punishment for sin but rather absorbs its consequences and, as three days later he is raised, defeats death. It is the resurrection God which finally puts the Victor in Christus Victor! So it is that in and through Jesus’ life, death, and resurrection God confronts and dethrones the powers of evil. (Chalke 2008: 44)

(….) The cross is not a form of cosmic child abuse a vengeful Father punishing his Son for an offense he did not commit. Rather than a symbol of vengeance or retribution, the cross of Christ is the greatest symbol of love and a demonstration of just how far God the Father and Jesus his Son are prepared to go to prove that love and to bring redemption to their creation. (Chalke 2008: 44)

~ ~ ~

MEANING OF THE DEATH ON THE CROSS

Although Jesus did not die this death on the cross to atone for the racial guilt of mortal man nor to provide some sort of effective approach to an otherwise offended and unforgiving God; even though the Son of Man did not offer himself as a sacrifice to appease the wrath of God and to open the way for sinful man to obtain salvation; notwithstanding that these ideas of atonement and propitiation are erroneous, nonetheless, there are significances attached to this death of Jesus on the cross which should not be overlooked. (Urantia Book 188:4.1)

(….) When once you grasp the idea of God as a true and loving Father, the only concept which Jesus ever taught, you must forthwith, in all consistency, utterly abandon all those primitive notions about God as an offended monarch, a stern and all-powerful ruler whose chief delight is to detect his subjects in wrongdoing and to see that they are adequately punished, unless some being almost equal to himself should volunteer to suffer for them, to die as a substitute and in their stead. The whole idea of ransom and atonement is incompatible with the concept of God as it was taught and exemplified by Jesus of Nazareth. The infinite love of God is not secondary to anything in the divine nature. (Urantia Book 188:4.8)

(….) This entire idea of the ransom of the atonement places salvation upon a plane of unreality; such a concept is purely philosophic. Human salvation is real; it is based on two realities which may be grasped by the creature’s faith and thereby become incorporated into individual human experience: the fact of the fatherhood of God and its correlated truth, the brotherhood of man. It is true, after all, that you are to be “forgiven your debts, even as you forgive your debtors.” (Urantia Book 188:4.13)

(….) The cross of Jesus portrays the full measure of the supreme devotion of the true shepherd for even the unworthy members of his flock. It forever places all relations between God and man upon the family basis. God is the Father; man is his son. Love, the love of a father for his son, becomes the central truth in the universe relations of Creator and creature—not the justice of a king which seeks satisfaction in the sufferings and punishment of the evil-doing subject. (Urantia Book 188:5.1)

LESSONS FROM THE CROSS

(….) The cross makes a supreme appeal to the best in man because it discloses one who was willing to lay down his life in the service of his fellow men. Greater love no man can have than this: that he would be willing to lay down his life for his friends—and Jesus had such a love that he was willing to lay down his life for his enemies, a love greater than any which had hitherto been known on earth. (188:5.7)

(….) Make sure, then, that when you view the cross as a revelation of God, you do not look with the eyes of the primitive man nor with the viewpoint of the later barbarian, both of whom regarded God as a relentless Sovereign of stern justice and rigid law-enforcement. Rather, make sure that you see in the cross the final manifestation of the love and devotion of Jesus to his life mission of bestowal upon the mortal races of his vast universe. See in the death of the Son of Man the climax of the unfolding of the Father’s divine love for his sons of the mortal spheres. The cross thus portrays the devotion of willing affection and the bestowal of voluntary salvation upon those who are willing to receive such gifts and devotion. There was nothing in the cross which the Father required—only that which Jesus so willingly gave, and which he refused to avoid. (188:5.11)

We know that the death on the cross was not to effect man’s reconciliation to God but to stimulate man’s realization of the Father’s eternal love and his Son’s unending mercy, and to broadcast these universal truths to a whole universe. (188:5.12)

Challenge and Riposte

You shall not portray your teacher as a man of sorrows. Future generations shall know also the radiance of our joy, the buoyance of our good will, and the inspiration of our good humor. We proclaim a message of good news which is infectious in its transforming power. Our religion is throbbing with new life and new meanings. Those who accept this teaching are filled with joy and in their hearts are constrained to rejoice evermore. Increasing happiness is always the experience of all who are certain about God. (153:3.10)

(….) The Master displayed great wisdom and manifested perfect fairness in all of his dealings with his apostles and with all of his disciples. Jesus was truly a master of men; he exercised great influence over his fellow men because of the combined charm and force of his personality. There was a subtle commanding influence in his rugged, nomadic, and homeless life. There was intellectual attractiveness and spiritual drawing power in his authoritative manner of teaching, in his lucid logic, his strength of reasoning, his sagacious insight, his alertness of mind, his matchless poise, and his sublime tolerance. He was simple, manly, honest, and fearless. With all of this physical and intellectual influence manifest in the Master’s presence, there were also all those spiritual charms of being which have become associated with his personality—patience, tenderness, meekness, gentleness, and humility. (Urantia Book 141:3.4)

Jesus of Nazareth was indeed a strong and forceful personality; he was an intellectual power and a spiritual stronghold. His personality not only appealed to the spiritually minded women among his followers, but also to the educated and intellectual Nicodemus and to the hardy Roman soldier, the captain stationed on guard at the cross, who, when he had finished watching the Master die, said, “Truly, this was a Son of God.” And red-blooded, rugged Galilean fishermen called him Master. (Urantia Book 141:3.5)

The pictures of Jesus have been most unfortunate. These paintings of the Christ have exerted a deleterious influence on youth; the temple merchants would hardly have fled before Jesus if he had been such a man as your artists usually have depicted. His was a dignified manhood; he was good, but natural. Jesus did not pose as a mild, sweet, gentle, and kindly mystic. His teaching was thrillingly dynamic. He not only meant well, but he went about actually doing good. (Urantia Book 141:3.6)

1.2. Acquiring Honor: Challenge and Riposte

Challenge-riposte describes a constant social tug of war, a game of social push and shove. Challenge-riposte is a type of social communication, since any social interaction is a form of communication. Someone (source) sends a message by means of a culturally recognized channel to a receiving individual, and this produces an effect. The source here is the challenger, while the message is a symbolized thing (e.g., word, a gift, an invitation) or event (e.g., a slap) or both. The channel of communication is always public, and the publicity of the message guarantees that the receiving individual will react, since even non-action is publicly interpreted, either as a riposte or a loss of honor. Consequently, challenge-riposte within context of honor is a social interaction with at least three phases:

(a) challenge in terms of some action (word, deed, or both) on the part of the challenger;

(b) perception of the message by both the individual to whom it is directed and the public at large; and

(c) reaction of the receiving individual and the evaluation of the reaction on the part of the public. (Neyrey 2005, 29)

The result is a highly stylized interaction which contains the following elements:

Typical Elements in a Challenge-Riposte Exchange

1. Claim (often implied by action or gesture)
2. Challenge
3. Riposte
4. Public verdict

The challenge-riposte interaction begins with some claim to enter the social space of another (for what follows, see Bourdieu 1966). This claim is always a challenge, and may be positive or negative. (Neyrey 2005, 29-30)

Cosmic Laughter

In 1494, just before the onslaught of the Reformation, Sebastian Brandt, a conservative Roman Catholic scholar living in Basel, looked at the reeking vice and folly of the church of his day and wrote Das Narrenschiff, a Ship of Fools. As the prologue tells us, “One vessel would be far too small / To carry all the fools I know.” Brandt’s veritable floating tub of dolts and sinners heads for an unknown destination, a land of Fools, and functions as a harbinger of an imminent schism. Eulogized as divina satira, divine satire, Ship of Fools catapulted Brandt into the ranks of Dante, at least among the Germans. (Lindvall 2015, 1)

— Terry Lindvall (2015, 1) God Mocks. NYU Press.

If the rich could hire other people to die for them, the poor could make a wonderful living.

Yiddish Proverb. Cited in Lindvall (2015, 3) God Mocks.

The Jesus movement very early on exchanged the vision for the visionary. Those first enthusiastic followers were enthralled by the world Jesus encapsulated in the parables and aphorisms, but, since they were unable to hold on to the vision embodied in those verbal vehicles, they turned from the story to the storyteller. They didn’t know how else to celebrate the revelation. They turned the iconoclast into an icon. (Funk 1996: 10-11)

(….) The quest for the historical Jesus is an effort to emancipate the Galilean sage from the tangle of Christian overlay that obscures, to some extent, who Jesus was and what he said, to distinguish the religion of Jesus from the religion about Jesus. That quest has been under way since the eighteenth century, when the first critical scholars asserted their independence from ecclesiastical control. It has continued unabated in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. (Funk 1996: 31)

(….) Jesus was a comic savant. He mixed humor with subversive and troubling knowledge born of direct insight. That was also the technique of Mark Twain and Will Rogers, who might also be described as comic savants. A comic savant is an intellectualbetter, poetwho is redefining what it means to be wise. That is the real role of the court jester: tell the king the truth but tell it as a joke. Jesters consequently enjoyed a limited immunity for their jokes. New truth is easier to embrace if it comes wrapped in humor. (Funk 1996: 158)

~ ~ ~

When someone slaps you on the right cheek,
turn the other as well.

If someone sues you for your coat,
Give him the shirt off your back to go with it.

When anyone conscripts you for one mile,
go along for two.

These admonitions give the appearance of being a series of particular cases that call for corresponding legal precedents. But, in fact, they parody case law and legal reasoning.

A blow to the right cheek would require a left-handed slap, which would be intended not to injure but to humiliate. The left hand was not used publicly in Jesus’ society, since it was used for unclean tasks. At Qumran to gesture with the left hand was punishable by ten days of penance. So a backhand slap to the right cheek was an insult delivered from a superior to an inferior, as Walter Wink has so brilliantly shown: master to slave, husband to wife, parent to child, Roman to Jew. Its message: Get back in your place. Don’t put on airs.

To turn the other cheek under the circumstances was an act of defiance. The left cheek invited a right-hand blow that might injure. The master, husband, or parent, or Roman would hesitate. The humiliation of the initial blow was answered with a nonviolent, very subtle, but quite effective challenge. The act of defiance entailed risk; it was symbolic, to be sure, but for that reason appealed to those who were regarded as subservient inferiors in Jesus’ world.

A coat was often given as surety for a loan or debt. The poor could lose their coats under such circumstances, but only during the daylight hours; at night, according to Deuteronimic law, the coat had to be returned since the truly destitute might have nothing else for warmth. Jesus’ injunction was to give up both coat and shirt. In a two-garment society, that meant going naked. Nakedness was frowned upon, to say the least. Again, according to the Manual of Discipline, one of the Dead Sea Scrolls, accidentally exposing one’s nakedness when taking one’s hand out of one’s robe called for thirty days of penance. Exposing oneself to a companion needlessly drew a penalty of six months. Jesus combined humor with a call for a serious infraction of the social code.

Roman soldiers were allowed to commandeer Judeans for a mile’s march to assist with gear. More than that was forbidden. To comply with a conscriptive order meant subservience; to refuse meant rebellion. Imagine the consternation of the Roman soldier when confronted with a Judean offer to carry the pack a second mile.

These examples all refer to real problems, real circumstances. The responses, however, are not prescriptive; they are suggestive of a behavior that undermines the intent of the initial act. (Funk 1996: 155)

~ ~ ~

Casting Off Body-Mind

The Understanding of One’s Personality

Unlike a thing, that is usually regarded as existence that is a means, a person is regarded as existence with the self as its own end. This is especially clear in Kantian ethics, which has given a philosophical foundation to the modern notions of personality, freedom, and responsibility. Kant distinguishes things and human personality, and insists that while things can only have value as existence that is a means, human personality has dignity and grace as existence with self-purpose. Although a human being can be used as a means, at the same time he or she must always be treated as an end. In the Kantian framework, this superiority of people over things, and end over means, should not be overcome. Thus Kant talks about the “Kingdom of ends” as the community of personality. Viewed in the light of Dōgen, this Kantian notion of personality not only is limited by anthropocentrism but also is not completely free from reification of the human self. In Dōgen, people are not essentially distinguished from other beings, but are grasped as a part of the realm of beings. People and other beings are equally subject to impermanence, or transiency. Although only people who have self-consciousness can realize the impermanency common to all beings as impermanency, they can overcome the problem of life and death only when they can overcome the transiency common to all beings. In Dōgen both suffering and emancipation from it are grasped on this transanthropocentric dimension. Hence Dōgen’s emphasis on the simultaneous attainment of Buddha-nature for self and others, and for humans and nature. In this simultaneous attainment, each person becomes an occasion or means for the others’ attainment just as each person realizes his or her own attainment. Here self-awakening and others’ awakening take place at the same time. While maintaining one’s individuality in terms of self-awakening, one serves as the means for the awakening of others. This dynamic mutuality takes place not only between the self and others, but also between humans and nature. This is the reason Dōgen emphasizes, in the “Bendōwa” fascicle, that

trees and grasses, wall and fence, expound and exalt the Dharma for the sake of ordinary people, sages, and all living beings. Ordinary people, sages, and all living beings in turn preach and exalt the Dharma for the sake of trees, grasses, wall, and fence. The dimension of self-enlightenment-qua-enlightening-others basically is fully replete with the characteristics of realization, and causes the principle of realization to function unceasingly.20

This mutual help for enlightenment between humans and nature, however, cannot take place insofar as humans take only themselves as the end. As Dōgen maintains:

To practice and confirm all things by conveying one’s self to them, is illusion; for all things to advance forward and practice and confirm the self, is enlightenment.21 (Abe 1992, 32)

The self must be emptied, for all things to advance and confirm the self. Accordingly, “to forget one’s self” is crucial. To forget one’s self is nothing other than body-mind casting off. And when body-mind are cast off, the world and history are also cast off. If body-mind are cast off without the world and history being cast off, it is not an authentic “body-mind casting off.” Further, “body-mind casting off” is not something negative. It is immediately the cast-off body-mind, that is, the awakened body-mind that is freed from self-attachment and ready to save others. In the same way, the casting off of the world and history, which takes place at the same time as the casting off of body-mind, is not something negative. It is directly the cast-off world and history, that is, the awakened world and awakened history, that “advance forward and practice and confirm the self.” (Abe 1992, 33)

Such are the implications of the notion of the oneness of means and end when the notion is applied to the understanding of one’s personality and its relationship to other persons and other things. Here we can see Dōgen’s challenge to the contemporary issues of ecology and history. The crucial point of this dynamic mutuality between the self and others, and humans and the world, is to forget one’s self, and one’s body-mind are cast off, is self-awakening-qua-awakening-others fully realized. This is not the “Kingdom of ends,” but the “Kingdom of dependent origination.” (Abe 1992, 33)

20 Shōbōgenzō “Bendōwa” The Eastern Buddhist, 136.
21 Shōbōgenzō “Bendōwa” The Eastern Buddhist, 133.

~ ~ ~