The easiest way to file a complaint about illegal fireworks being discharged in your neighborhood is to file an online complaint (Instructions for Filing Online Complaint). A description of the overall complaint process can be found here. The process works, for I tested it on a violator who chose to shoot illegal fireworks off despite the ban and they were sent a warning letter. If they choose to persist next year, despite it being illegal, it will be a fine.
To report violators of the unincorporated King County ban on illegal firework it is best to gather the evidence prior to submitting the report.* The best evidence is a video of the violator shooting off the fireworks along with the address and parcel number of the property. After taking a video of the violation and obtaining the address of offender go to the King County Parcel Viewer and enter the address to obtain the properties parcel number and property owner information (see instructions below). After gathering the video and/or pictures, address of the violator, and parcel information go to the online code enforcement reporting page. Select the “File a complaint online” button and you will be presented with a online form to fill for filing a complaint. This complaint can be filed anonymously and there is no need to register a user account. On the Code Enforcement page select the Enforcement menu item (if not visible use drop down “more” menu):
You can use Google Maps to locate the home address using the street view feature. Once you have obtained the violator’s address you can then go to the Parcel Viewer and enter the address and obtain the property parcel number and owner information. A good way to get familiar with using Google Maps and King County Parcel Viewer is to first use Google Maps to locate your own home and obtain the address and then to the Parcel Viewer and enter your address and obtain your parcel viewer and owner information for practice.
With the video evidence and/or pictures—which can be uploaded with complaint—and property parcel number, property owner’s information, and violator’s address you can then fill out the complaint form and monitor its progress via the code enforcement page.
* An effective way to gather evidence of illegal public firework displays in surrounding neighborhoods is to drive to the location where the fireworks are being discharged (one can easily see the mortars going off) with a video camera mounted in the window (or on foot using one’s phone) and document the illegal firework display and the address of the individual discharging the illegal fireworks. Then use Google Maps and the Parcel View to obtain the required information to file a code enforcement complaint online. Discrete body cameras are also an option. Do not verbally confront or engage with the individuals engaging in illegal activity to avoid potential conflict.
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Addendum: Some individuals on social media claim that discharging fireworks is their constitutional right and that banning fireworks is unconstitutional. This is pure misinformation and nonsense on stilts. There is nothing in the U.S. Constitution that gives individuals the right to discharge fireworks. As a simple matter of fact, the regulation of fireworks falls within the jurisdiction of state law and local county and city ordinances as determined by elected officials and/or referendums. Washington State Law (RCW 70.77.250(4), RCW 70.77.395) gives King County Council the authority to regulate fireworks (see Title 17 Fire Code Updated July 7, 2002, chapter 17.11) as authorized by the Washington State SENATE BILL 6080.
HISTORY HAS BEEN used and abused more than once in the Ukraine Crisis, informing and inspiring its participants but also justifying violations of international law, human rights, and the right to life itself. The Russo-Ukrainian conflict, while arising unexpectedly and taking many of those involved by surprise, has deep historical roots and is replete with historical references and allusions. Leaving aside the propagandistic use of historical arguments, at least three parallel processes rooted in the past are now going on in Ukraine: Russia’s attempts to reestablish political, economic, and military control in the former imperial space acquired by Moscow since the mid-seventeenth century; the formation of modern national identities, which concerns both Russians and Ukrainians (the latter often divided along regional lines); and the struggle over historical and cultural fault lines that allow the participants in the conflict to imagine it as a contest between East and West, Europe and the Russian World. (Plokhy, Serhii. The Gates of Europe (p. 486). Basic Books. Kindle Edition.)
The Russo-Ukrainian conflict reminded the world of the Russian annexation of the Crimea in the last decades of the eighteenth century and the creation in southern Ukraine of the short-lived imperial province of New Russia. This memory of Russian imperial expansion into the area was brought to the fore not by outside observers trying to portray current Russian behavior as imperial but by ideologues of the Russian hybrid war in Ukraine, who came up with the New Russia project. They sought to develop their historical ideology on the foundations of imperial conquest and Russian dominance in lands originally inhabited by the Crimean and Noghay Tatars and Zaporozhian Cossacks. This pertains especially to the trope of Sevastopol as a city of Russian glory—a historical myth rooted in the 1853–1856 Crimean War (a disaster for the Russian Empire) that attributes the heroism of the multiethnic imperial army defending the city to Russians alone. (Plokhy, Serhii. The Gates of Europe (pp. 486-487). Basic Books. Kindle Edition.)
The formation of the Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics,” along with the attempts to proclaim Odesa and Kharkiv republics—building blocks of a future New Russia—also had its roots in historical memory. It went back to Bolshevik attempts to maintain control over Ukraine’s east and south soon after the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany (February 1918), which assigned those regions to Ukraine. At that time the Bolsheviks were using self-proclaimed states, including the Crimean and Donetsk–Kryvyi Rih Soviet republics, to claim that they were not part of Ukraine and thus not covered by the treaty. The founders of the new Donetsk republic claimed to use the symbols of the Donetsk–Kryvyi Rih republic of 1918, as, like the old one, theirs would not have arisen or survived without Moscow’s sponsorship and support. (Plokhy, Serhii. The Gates of Europe (p. 487). Basic Books. Kindle Edition.)
While allusions to the Russian imperial and revolutionary past became part of the historical discourse justifying the Russian aggression against Ukraine, its historical motivation is more recent. The rapid and unexpected disintegration of the Soviet Union, recalled by President Vladimir Putin in his speech on the annexation of the Crimea, provides the most immediate historical background to the crisis. The current Russian government keeps claiming that Ukraine is an artificial formation whose eastern territories were allegedly a gift to the country from the Bolsheviks, as was the Crimea after World War II. According to this narrative, the only genuine and thus historically legitimate polity is the empire—first the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Union. The Russian government actively combats and suppresses any historical traditions and memories that undermine the legitimacy of the empire, such as commemoration of the 1932–1933 Great Ukrainian Famine or the Soviet government’s 1944 deportation of the Crimean Tatars; such was the case with the ban on public commemoration of the seventieth anniversary of the Crimean Tatar deportation imposed by the Russian authorities in the Crimea in May 2014. (Plokhy, Serhii. The Gates of Europe (pp. 487-488). Basic Books. Kindle Edition.)
Russia today seems to be following in the footsteps of some of its imperial predecessors who continued to harbor nostalgia for their empires long after they were lost. The collapse of the Soviet Union left Russian elites bitter about their loss of imperial and superpower status, nourishing illusions that what had happened was an accident brought about by the ill will of the West or by politicians like Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin foolishly bickering for power. Such a view of the end of the Soviet Union makes it hard to resist the temptation to rewrite history. (Plokhy, Serhii. The Gates of Europe (p. 488). Basic Books. Kindle Edition. )
THE RUSSO-UKRAINIAN CONFLICT also brought to the fore another important issue with historical roots and ramifications: the unfinished process of building the modern Russian and Ukrainian nations. The Russian annexation of the Crimea and the propaganda intended to justify Russian aggression in the Donbas have proceeded under the slogan of defending the rights of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in general. The equation of the Russian language not only with Russian culture but also with Russian nationality has been an important aspect of the worldview of many Russian volunteers who have come to Donbas. One problem with that interpretation of Russianness is that while ethnic Russians indeed make up a majority of the population in the Crimea and large minorities in parts of the Donbas, most of the population of the projected New Russia consists of ethnic Ukrainians. While Russian and separatist propaganda has had an appeal for many ethnic Ukrainians, most have refused to identify themselves with Russia or with Russian ethnicity even as they continue to use the Russian language. That was one of the main reasons for the failure of the New Russia project, which came as a complete surprise to its authors. (Plokhy, Serhii. The Gates of Europe (pp. 488-489). Basic Books. Kindle Edition.)
The view of Ukrainians as constituents of the Russian nation goes back to the founding myth of modern Russia as a nation conceived and born in Kyiv, the “mother of Russian [rather than Rus’] cities.” The Synopsis of 1674, the first printed “textbook” of Russian history, compiled by Kyivan monks seeking the protection of the Muscovite tsars, first formulated and widely disseminated this myth in Russia. Throughout most of the imperial period, Ukrainians were regarded as Little Russians—a vision that allowed for the existence of Ukrainian folk culture and spoken vernacular but not a high culture or a modern literature. Recognition of Ukrainians as a distinct nation in cultural but not political terms in the aftermath of the Revolution of 1917 challenged that vision. The aggression of 2014, backed by the ideology of the “Russian World,” offers Ukrainians today a throwback in comparison with Soviet practices. Nation building as conceived in a future New Russia makes no provision for a separate Ukrainian ethnicity within a broader Russian nation. This is hardly an oversight or excess born of the heat of battle. Less than a year before the annexation of the Crimea, Vladimir Putin himself went on record claiming that Russians and Ukrainians were one and the same people. He repeated that statement in a speech delivered on March 18, 2015, to mark the first anniversary of the annexation of the Crimea. (Plokhy, Serhii. The Gates of Europe (p. 489). Basic Books. Kindle Edition.)
Since the fall of the USSR, the Russian nation-building project has switched its focus to the idea of forming a single Russian nation not divided into branches and unifying the Eastern Slavs on the basis of the Russian language and culture. Ukraine has become the first testing ground for this model outside the Russian Federation. (Plokhy, Serhii. The Gates of Europe (pp. 489-490). Basic Books. Kindle Edition. )
At the end of the nineteenth century, Charles Sanders Pierce, a founder of the American school of pragmatist philosophy, distinguished three broad styles of reasoning.
Deductive reasoning reaches logical conclusions from stated premises. For example, ‘Evangelical Christians are Republican. Republicans voted for Donald Trump. Evangelical Christians voted for Donald Trump.’ This syllogism is descriptive of a small world. As soon as one adds the word ‘most’ before either evangelical Christians or Republicans, the introduction of the inevitable vagueness of the larger world modifies the conclusion.
Inductive reasoning is of the form ‘analysis of election results shows that they normally favour incumbent parties in favourable economic circumstances and opposition parties in adverse economic circumstances’. Since economic conditions in the United States in 2016 were neither particularly favourable nor unfavourable, we might reasonably have anticipated a close result. Inductive reasoning seeks to generalise from observations, and may be supported or refuted by subsequent experience.
Abductive reasoning seeks to provide the best explanation of a unique event. For example, an abductive approach might assert that Donald Trump won the 2016 presidential election because of concerns in particular swing states over economic conditions and identity, and because his opponent was widely disliked.
Deductive, inductive and abductive reasoning each have a role to play in understanding the world, and as we move to larger worlds the role of the inductive and abductive increases relative to the deductive. And when events are essentially one-of-a-kind, which is often the case in the world of radical uncertainty, abductive reasoning is indispensable. Although the term ‘abductive reasoning’ may be unfamiliar, we constantly reason in this way, searching for the best explanation of what we see: ‘I think the bus is late because of congestion in Oxford Street’. But the methods of decision analysis we have described in earlier chapters are derived almost entirely from the deductive reasoning which is relevant only in small worlds. (Kay, John. Radical Uncertainty: Decision-Making Beyond the Numbers (pp. 137-138). W. W. Norton & Company. Kindle Edition.)
(….) Most problems we confront in life are typically not well defined and do not have single analytic solutions.
(….) But logic derived from reasonably maintained premises can only ever take us so far. Under radical uncertainty, the premises from which we reason will never represent a complete description of the world. There will be different actions which might properly be described as ‘rational’ given any particular set of beliefs about the world. As soon as any element of subjectivity is attached either to the probabilities or to the valuation of the outcomes, problems cease to have any objectively correct solution.
(Kay, John. Radical Uncertainty: Decision-Making Beyond the Numbers (pp. 137-139). W. W. Norton & Company. Kindle Edition.)
DIFFERENT WAYS OF USING THE MIND
Mathematics has something to teach us, all of us, whether or not we like mathematics or use it very much. This lesson has to do with thinking, the way we use our minds to draw conclusions about the world around us. When most people think about mathematics they think about the logic of mathematics. They think that mathematics is characterized by a certain mode of using the mind, a mode I shall henceforth refer to as “algorithmic.” By this I mean a step-by-step, rule-based procedure for going from old truths to new ones through a process of logical reasoning. But is this really the only way that we think in mathematics? Is this the way that new mathematical truths are brought into being? Most people are not aware that there are, in fact, other ways of using the mind that are at play in mathematics. After all, where do the new ideas come from? Do they come from logic or from algorithmic processes? In mathematical research, logic is used in a most complex way, as a constraint on what is possible, as a goad to creativity, or as a kind of verification device, a way of checking whether some conjecture is valid. Nevertheless, the creativity of mathematics—the turning on of the light switch—cannot be reduced to its logical structure. (Byers, William. How Mathematicians Think (p. 5). Princeton University Press. Kindle Edition.)
Where does mathematical creativity come from? This book will point toward a certain kind of situation that produces creative insights. This situation, which I call “ambiguity,” also provides a mechanism for acts of creativity. The “ambiguous” could be contrasted to the “deductive,” yet the two are not mutually exclusive. Strictly speaking, the “logical” should be contrasted to the “intuitive.” The ambiguous situation may contain elements of the logical and the intuitive, but it is not restricted to such elements. An ambiguous situation may even involve the contradictory, but it would be wrong to say that the ambiguous is necessarily illogical.
(Byers, William. How Mathematicians Think (pp. 5-6). Princeton University Press. Kindle Edition.)
Science has always had (…) a metaphoric function — that is, it generates an important part of culture’s symbolic vocabulary and provides some of the metaphysical bases and philosophical orientations of our ideology. As a consequence the methods of argument of science, its conceptions and its models, have permeated first the intellectual life of the time, then the tenets and usages of everyday life. All philosophies share with science the need to work with concepts such as space, time, quantity, matter, order, law, causality, verification, reality. (Holton 2000, 43, in Einstein, History and Other Passions)
Our discussion of the nature of physical concepts has shown that a main reason for formulating concepts is to use them in connection with mathematically stated laws. It is tempting to go one step further and to demand that practicing scientists deal only with ideas corresponding to strict measurables, that they formulate only concepts reducible to the least ambiguous of all data: numbers and measurements. The history of science would indeed furnish examples to show the great advances that followed from the formation of strictly quantitative concepts. (Holton and Brush 2001, 170)
(….) The nineteenth-century physicist Lord Kelvin commended this attitude in the famous statement:
I often say that when you can measure what you are speaking about and express it in numbers you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of meagre and unsatisfactory kind: it may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely, in your thoughts, advanced to the stage of Science, whatever the matter may be. (“Electrical Units of Measurement”)
Useful though this trend is within its limits [emphasis added], there is an entirely different aspect to scientific concepts: indeed it is probable that science would stop if every scientist were to avoid anything other than strictly quantitative concepts. We shall find that a position like Lord Kelvin’s (which is similar to that held at present by some thinkers in the social sciences) does justice neither to the complexity and fertility of the human mind nor to the needs of contemporary physical science itselfnot to scientists nor to science. Quite apart from the practical impossibility of demanding of one’s mind that at all times it identify such concepts as electron only with the measurable aspects of that construct, there are specifically two main objections: First, this position misunderstands how scientists as individuals do their work, and second, it misunderstands how science as a system grows out of the contribution of individuals. (Holton and Brush 2001, 170-171)
(….) While a scientist struggles with a problem, there can be little conscious limitation on his free and at times audacious constructions. Depending on his field, his problem, his training, and his temperament, he may allow himself to be guided by a logical sequence based on more or less provisional hypotheses, or equally likely by “feelings for things,” by likely analogy, by some promising guess, or he may follow a judicious trial-and-error procedure.
The well-planned experiment is, of course, by far the most frequent one in modern science and generally has the best chance of success; but some men and women in science have often not even mapped out a tentative plan of attack on the problems, but have instead let their enthusiasms, their hunches, and their sheer joy of discovery suggest the line of work. Sometimes, therefore, the discovery of a new effect or tool or technique is followed by a period of trying out one or the other applications in a manner that superficially almost seems playful. Even the philosophical orientation of scientists is far less rigidly prescribed than might be supposed. (Holton and Brush 2001, 170-171)
The idea of inevitable conflict between science and religion was decisively challenged by John Hedley Brooke in his classic Science and religion: Some historical perspectives (Cambridge, 1991). Almost two decades on, Science and religion: New Historical perspectives revisits this argument and asks how historians can now impose order on the complex and contingent histories of religious engagements with science.
Bringing together leading scholars, this new volume explores the history and changing meanings of the categories ‘science’ and ‘religion’; the role of publishing and education in forging and spreading ideas; the connection between knowledge, power, and intellectual imperialism; and the reasons for the confrontation between evolution and creationism among American Christians and in the Islamic world. A major contribution to the historiography of science and religion, this book makes the most recent scholarship on this much misunderstood debate widely accessible. (Dixon et. al. 2010, Front Material, in Science and Religion: New Historical Perspectives)
I propose, then, to present to you this evening an outline of the great sacred struggle for the liberty of Science-a struggle which has been going on for so many centuries. A tough contest this has been! A war continued longer-with battles fiercer, with sieges more persistent, with strategy more vigorous than in any of the comparatively petty warfares of Alexander, or Cxsar, or Napoleon … In all modern history, interference with Science in the supposed interest of religion-no matter how conscientious such interference may have been-has resulted in the direst evils both to Religion and Science, and invariably. —Andrew Dickson White, “The Battle-Fields of Science” (1869)
The antagonism we thus witness between Religion and Science is the continuation of a struggle that commenced when Christianity began to attain political power … The history of Science is not a mere record of isolated discoveries; it is a narrative of the conflict of two contending powers, the expansive force of the human intellect on one side, and the compression arising from traditionary faith and human interests on the other. —John William Draper, History of the Conflict between Religion and Science (1874)
The greatest myth in the history of science and religion holds that they have been in a state of constant conflict. No one bears more responsibility for promoting this notion than two nineteenth-century American polemicists: Andrew Dickson White (1832-1918) and John William Draper (1811-1882). White, the young president of Cornell University, became a believer in the warfare between science and religion after religious critics branded him an infidel for, as he put it, trying to create in Ithaca “[a]n asylum for Science—where truth shall be sought for truth’s sake, not stretched or cut exactly to fit Revealed Religion.” On a winter’s evening in December 1869 he strode to the podium in the great hall of Cooper Union in New York City, ready to smite his enemies with history, to give them “a lesson which they will remember.” In a melodramatic lecture titled “The Battle-Fields of Science” the historian surveyed “some of the hardest-fought battle-fields” of the “great war” between science and religion. He told of Giordano Bruno’s being “burned alive as a monster of impiety,” of Galileo’s having been “tortured tured and humiliated as the worst of unbelievers,” and much more, ending with the latest scientific martyrs, Cornell University and its beleaguered president. As White must have anticipated, his lecture sparked even more controversy, prompting, according to one observer, “instantaneous outcry and opposition.” Over the next quarter century White expanded his talk into a huge two-volume work, A History of the Warfare of Science ence with Theology in Christendom (1896), widely translated and frequently reprinted down to the present. In it, as Elizabeth Cady Stanton gleefully noted, he showed “that the Bible has been the greatest block in the way of progress.”‘ (Galileo Goes to Jail and Other Myths about Science and Religion (Kindle Locations 39-49). Kindle Edition.)
Draper was equally exercised when he wrote his History of the Conflict between Religion and Science (1874). An accomplished physician, chemist, and historian, Draper largely excused Protestantism and Eastern Orthodoxy of crimes against science while excoriating Roman Catholicism. He did so, he wrote, “partly because its adherents compose the majority of Christendom, partly because its demands are the most pretentious, and partly because it has commonly sought to enforce those demands by the civil power.” In addition to chronicling the church’s age-old opposition to scientific progress, he ridiculed the recently promulgated doctrine of papal infallibility, which he attributed to men “of sin and shame.” He never publicly mentioned, however, what may have agitated him the most: his antipathy toward his own sister, Elizabeth, who had converted to Catholicism and who for a time lived with the Drapers. When one of the Draper children, eight-year-old William, lay near death, Aunt Elizabeth hid his favorite book, a Protestant devotional tract-and did not return it until after the boy had passed away. The grieving father angrily kicked her out of his house, no doubt blaming the Vatican for her un-Christian and dogmatic behavior. Draper’s tale of “ferocious theologians” hounding the pioneers of science “with a Bible in one hand and a fiery fagot in the other,” as one critic characterized his account, understandably provoked numerous counterattacks. The American convert to Catholicism Orestes Brownson, who described the book as “a tissue of lies from beginning to end,” could scarcely contain his fury. “A thousand highway-robberies or a thousand cold-blooded murders,” he fumed, “would be but a light social offence in comparison with the publication of one such book as this before us..” (Galileo Goes to Jail and Other Myths about Science and Religion (Kindle Locations 49-59). Kindle Edition.)
(….) Discussions of the relationship between “science” and “religion” originated in the early nineteenth century, when students of nature first began referring to their work as science rather than as natural philosophy (or natural history). Before that time there were occasional expressions of concern about the tension between faith and reason, but no one pitted religion against science or vice versa.’ By the 1820s, however, books and articles featuring the phrase “science and religion” in their titles were starting to appear. One of the first, if not the first, English-language books with the words in their titles came out in 1823: Thomas Dick’s popular The Christian Philosopher; or, The Connection of Science and Philosophy with Religion. By midcentury “science and religion” was becoming a literary trope, and during the 1850s and 1860s several American colleges and seminaries established professorships devoted to demonstrating (and preserving) the harmony of science and revealed religion.4 (Galileo Goes to Jail and Other Myths about Science and Religion (Kindle Locations 59-64). Kindle Edition.)
Although a few freethinkers, most notoriously Thomas Cooper of South Carolina College, denounced religion as “the great enemy of Science,” antebellum Americans, especially the clergy, worried far more about the threat of science to orthodox Christianity than about religious barriers to science. By the middle third of the nineteenth century some observers were beginning to suspect that “every new conquest achieved by science, involved the loss of a domain to religion.” Especially disturbing were scientific challenges to the first chapters of the Bible. During the three decades between about 1810 and 1840 men of science pushed successfully to replace the supernatural creation of the solar system with the nebular hypothesis, to expand the history of life on earth from 6,000 to millions of years, and to shrink Noah’s flood to a regional event in the Near East. Many Christians readily adjusted their reading of the Bible to accommodate such findings, but some biblical literalists thought that the geologists of the day were taking too many liberties with God’s word. The Reverend Gardiner Spring, for example, resented scientific efforts to explain creation, which he regarded as “a great miracle,” incapable of being accounted for scientifically. “The collision is not between the Bible & Nature,” he declared, “but between the Bible & natural philosophers.”‘ (Galileo Goes to Jail and Other Myths about Science and Religion (Kindle Locations 64-71). Kindle Edition.)
At the time it was not uncommon for men of science to engage in biblical exegesis while denying theologians and clergymen the right to monitor science. This practice, along with the increasing marginalization of theologians from the scientific enterprise, Charles Hodge, the most eminent Calvinist theologian in midcentury America. Although he continued to venerate men of science who disclosed “the wonderful works of God,” by the late 1850s he was growing increasingly frustrated by their tendency to treat theologians who expressed themselves on scientific subjects as “trespassers” who should mind their own business. He attributed the growing “alienation” between men of science and men of the cloth in part to the former’s “assumption of superiority” and their practice of stigmatizing their religious critics “as narrow-minded, bigots, old women, Bible worshippers, etc.” He resented the lack of respect frequently shown to religious men, who were instructed by their scientific colleagues to quit meddling in science, while they themselves belittled religious beliefs and values. At times Hodge worried that science, devoid of religion, was becoming downright “satanic.” He had no doubt that religion was in a “fight for its life against a large class of scientific men.”6 (Galileo Goes to Jail and Other Myths about Science and Religion (Kindle Locations 71-78). Kindle Edition.)
The spread of “infidel” science—from geology and cosmogonies to biology and anthropology—caused many Christians, both conservatives and liberals, to feel under attack. According to the southern intellectual George Frederick Holmes, “The struggle between science and religion, between philosophy and faith, has been protracted through centuries; but it is only within recent years that the breach has become so open and avowed as to be declared by many to be irreconcilable.” Worse yet, even the working classes were joining the fray. As one British writer noted in 1852, “Science is no longer a lifeless abstraction floating above the heads of the multitude. It has descended to earth. It mingles with men. It penetrates our mines. It enters our workshops. It speeds along with the iron courser of the rail.”7 (Galileo Goes to Jail and Other Myths about Science and Religion (Kindle Locations 78-82). Kindle Edition.)
The debates over Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species (1859), in which the British naturalist sought “to overthrow the dogma of separate creations” and extend the domain of natural law throughout the organic world, signaled a shift in emphasis. Increasingly, scientists, as they were coming to be called, expressed pressed resentment at playing handmaiden to religion. One after another called not only for scientific freedom but also for the subordination of religion—and the rewriting of history with religion as the villain. The most infamous outburst came from the Irish physicist John Tyndall (1820-1893), who in his 1874 Belfast address as president of the British Association for the Advancement of Science thundered: (Galileo Goes to Jail and Other Myths about Science and Religion (Kindle Locations 82-86). Kindle Edition.)
The impregnable position of science may be described in a few words. We claim, and we shall wrest from theology, the entire domain of cosmological theory. All schemes and systems which thus infringe upon the domain of science must, in so far as they do this, submit to its control, and relinquish all thought of controlling it. Acting otherwise proved disastrous in the past, and it is simply fatuous to-day. (Galileo Goes to Jail and Other Myths about Science and Religion (Kindle Locations 86-89). Kindle Edition.)
Two years later Tyndall wrote a laudatory preface to a British edition of White’s The Warfare of Science. With such endorsements, the conflict thesis was well on its way toward becoming the historical dogma of the day, at least among intellectuals seeking freedom from religion.’ (Galileo Goes to Jail and Other Myths about Science and Religion (Kindle Locations 89-90). Kindle Edition.)
Historians of science have known for years that White’s and Draper’s accounts are more propaganda than history.’ (An opposing ing myth, that Christianity alone gave birth to modern science, is disposed of in Myth 9.) Yet the message has rarely escaped the ivory tower. The secular public, if it thinks about such issues at all, knows that organized religion has always opposed scientific progress (witness the attacks on Galileo, Darwin, and Scopes). The religious public knows that science has taken the leading role in corroding faith (through naturalism and antibiblicism). As a first step toward correcting these misperceptions we must dispel the hoary myths that continue to pass as historical truths. No scientist, to our knowledge, ever lost his life because of his scientific views, though, as we shall see in Myth 7, the Italian Inquisition did incinerate the sixteenth-century Copernican Giordano Bruno for his heretical theological notions. (Galileo Goes to Jail and Other Myths about Science and Religion (Kindle Locations 90-95). Kindle Edition.)
Unlike the master mythmakers White and Draper, the contributors to this volume have no obvious scientific or theological axes to grind. Nearly half, twelve of twenty-five, self-identify as agnostic or atheist (that is, unbelievers in religion). Among the remaining thirteen there are five mainstream Protestants, two evangelical Protestants, one Roman Catholic, one Jew, one Muslim, one Buddhist—and two whose beliefs fit no conventional category (including one pious Spinozist). Over half of the unbelievers, including me, grew up in devout Christian homes—some as fundamentalists or evangelicals—but subsequently lost their faith. I’m not sure exactly what to make of this fact, but I suspect it tells us something about why we care so much about setting the record straight. (Galileo Goes to Jail and Other Myths about Science and Religion (Kindle Locations 95-99). Kindle Edition.)
A final word about our use of the word myth: Although some of the myths we puncture may have helped to give meaning to the lives of those embracing them, we do not employ the term in its sophisticated academic sense but rather use it as done in everyday conversation—to designate a claim that is false. (Galileo Goes to Jail and Other Myths about Science and Religion (Kindle Locations 99-101). Kindle Edition.)
Reason and intellect may take a man to the doorsteps of the domain of faith, but only revelation and the mercy of Allah will enable him to enter it. (Hamdani, Ibrahim 1989, 36, in Three Faiths One God: A Jewish, Christian, Muslim Encounter)
The vision to be set forth in this presentation is of the unity or coherence of humankind’s religious history. (Wilfred Cantwell Smith 1981, 3, in Towards a World Theology)
Observing minds and discriminating souls know religion when they find it in the lives of their fellows. Religion requires no definition; we all know its social, intellectual, moral, and spiritual fruits. And this all grows out of the fact that religion is the property of the human race; it is not a child of culture. True, one’s perception of religion is still human and therefore subject to the bondage of ignorance, the slavery of superstition, the deceptions of sophistication, and the delusions of false philosophy. (1119: 6)
The impact of agnostic science will turn out to have been child’s play compared to the challenge to Christian theology of the faith of other men…. The era of religious isolationism is about to be as much at an end as that of political isolationism already is…. The time will soon be with us when a theologian who attempts to work out his position unaware that he does so as a member of a world society in which other theologians equally intelligent, equally devout, equally moral, are Hindus, Buddhists, Muslims, and unaware that his readers are likely perhaps to be Buddhists or to have Muslim husbands or Hindu colleagues—such a theologian is as out of date as is one who attempts to construct an intellectual position unaware that Aristotle has thought about the world or that existentialists have raised new orientations, or unaware that the earth is a minor planet in a galaxy that is vast only by terrestrial standards. Philosophy and science have impinged so far on theological thought more effectively than has comparative religion, but this will not last. (Smith 1982, 7,8,9, in Religious Diversity)
The only basis on which it [Islam] distinguishes between humans is on the basis of their moral personality—their ability, that is, to acquire taqwa, or God-consciousness—and it is in terms of their moral praxis that individuals will be judged and recompensed in the Hereafter. What matters in and to the Qur’an, then, is not sex/gender, but an individual’s ‘faith and deeds’. (Barlas, Asma. Amina Wadud’s hermeneutics of the Qur’an. In Modern Muslim Intellectuals and the Qur’an (editor Suha Taji-Farouki). Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2004; p. 114.)
Tasdiq is to recognize a truth, to appropriate it, to affirm it, to confirm it, to actualize it. And the truth, in each case, is personalist and sincere…. [F]aith is then the recognition of divine truth at the personal level. Faith is the ability to recognize truth as true for oneself, and to trust it. Especially in the Islamic case, with its primarily moral orientation, this includes, or makes primary, the recognition of the authenticity, a moral authority, of the divine commands. Thus there is a recognition of the obligatoriness of moral obligations; and the acceptance of their obligatoriness as applying to oneself, with the personal commitment then to carrying them out.
Again: it is the personal making of what is cosmically true come true on earth–the actualization of truth (the truth about man).
More mystically, it is the discovery of truth (the personal truth) of the Islamic injunctions: the process of personal verification of them, whereby, by living them out, one proves them and finds that they do indeed become true, both for oneself and for society and world in which one lives.
Tasdiq is the inner appropriation and outward implementation of truth. It is the process of making or finding true in actual human life, in one’s own personal spirit and overt behavior, what God–or Reality—intends for man.
And with many a passage strongly insisting that faith is more than knowledge, that it is a question of how one responds to the truth, one may also render the proposition ‘faith is tasdiq‘ as ‘Faith is the ability to trust, and to act in terms of, what one knows to be true’. (Smith 1981: 150-151)
(….) Faith, then, is the positive response to God’s initiative. It is not merely knowledge: it includes knowledge, but is something else as well. That something additional, the men of kalam came to agree, is tasdiq. Huwa (that is al-tasdiq) amr za’id ‘ala al-‘ilm.
We turn, then, from faith to tasdiq… We can now see that it designates not belief, but knowledge; and not merely knowledge, but knowledge of the truth plus something else. (Neither of these two components—neither that of knowing the truth, nor that of the something additional—is found in the current Western translations …). (Smith 1981: 155)
(….) What, then, is tasdiq? Clearly, it lies in the realm of activist sincerity. Sidq … designates truth at the personalist level, of recognition and integrity: the second form of the very designates an activating of this.
Fundamental for understanding one of the prime meanings of tasdiq in this connection is a remark such as the following of al-Tabari:
Obviously this is not ‘to believe’ but rather to confirm, to actualize the truth. They ‘… spoke the truth with their tongues, but did not corroborate what they were saying with their deeds’. Or one might use such verbs as ‘authenticate’ or ‘validate’. An older usage in English would legitimately appear here if one translated by: ‘… they were not faithful to what they were saying, in their deeds’. (Smith 1981: 156)
The actualizing aspect of tasdiq is illuminated, again, in the oft-cited statement, al-iman ma waqara fi alqalb, wa-saddaqahu al-amal. ‘Faith is that about which the heart is firm, and that deeds validate (authenticate, corroborate).’
Again, and more theologically, the fact that God Himself is called mu’min is also explained, by al-Baghdadi, as His being actively faithful in this sense:
(It would be ludicrous to translate either iman or tasdiq as ‘believing’ in any of these cases–and I feel, in any cases at all).
The difference, then, between knowledge and tasdiq lies in the sincerity and in the opperationalist addenda denoted by the latter term. Knowledge is the perception of the truth outside oneself; tasdiq is the personal appropriation of that perception. It is the inner reordering of oneself so as to act in terms of it; the interiorization and implementation of the truth in dynamic sincerity. Tasdiq means not ‘to believe’ but rather to recognize a truth and to existentialize it. (Smith 1981: 156)
(….) All this is especially relevant to, and leads to a consideration of, the second of the two fundamental orientations that we averred to be characteristic of Islamic life and significant for its faith—namely, the moral. For the truth to which the Muslim must respond is largely a moral truth. The knowledge conferred by revelation is largely a knowledge of moral requirements, of commands, of duties: awamir, ahkam, fara’id. In the moral life especially, as all of us recognize, knowledge is not yet virtue. The recognition of that something out to be done is not yet the recognition that I ought to do it, not yet the resolve to do it, not yet my personal decision to act. Involved in the moral life is a particular quality or act, more than and other than knowledge and its awareness of objective truth, a quality that brings one to the point of committing oneself to act in terms of what one has recognized as right. This is tasdiq, and to have it is to have faith. (Smith 1981: 157-158)
(….) One of the compelling expositions of the matter comes in the fuller elaboration of a statement by the later writer al-Kastalt …: ‘Al-tasdiq does not mean knowing the truth …; no, it is rather a yielding to what is known and a letting oneself be led by it, setting aside recalcitrance and stubborness, and constructing one’s actions in accordance with it’. (This is a beautiful example of a passage that Christian [or Buddhist, or Jewish] theology could be happy and proud to take over word for word ….) (Smith 1981: 158)
When one has worked one’s entire career within the framework of a powerful paradigm, it is almost impossible to look at that paradigm as anything but the proper, if not the only possible, perspective one can have on (in this case) biology. Yet despite its great accomplishments, molecular biology is far from the “perfect paradigm” most biologists take it to be. This child of reductionist materialism has nearly driven the biology out of biology. Molecular biology’s reductionism is fundamentalist, unwavering, and procrustean. It strips the organism from its environment, shears it of its history (evolution), and shreds it into parts. A sense of the whole, of the whole cell, of the whole multicellular organism, of the biosphere, of the emergent quality of biological organization, all have been lost or sidelined.
(Woese, Carl R. (2005, 101) Evolving Biological Organization. In Microbial Phylogeny and Evolution: Concepts and Controversies (Jan Sapp, ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.)
“Whether you can observe a thing or not depends on the theory which you use. It is theory which decides what can be observed” (Albert Einstein speaking to Werner Heisenberg during his 1926 Berlin lecture, quoted in Salam 1990).
—Edward Fullbrook (2016, 3) Narrative Fixation in Economics
It is essential to recognise here that the alternative to an explicit philosophy of science is not an absence of philosophy. Rather, it is an implicit and often bad philosophy. And, whatever may be the theoretical or substantive orientations of contemporary economists (whether econometricians, axiomatic-deductive theorists, hermeneuticists, and so on) their practices are all underpinned or informed by (competing) science-oriented philosophies of some sort. Of course, much of this is often tacit or unacknowledged, and it may be in contradiction with other beliefs. But it is precisely because of this that philosophical analysis can go to work. There is always the possibility that explicit methodological investigation of scientific practice, or other social forms, can make a contribution by rendering explicit some knowledge that is already implicit but unrecognised, and perhaps, in the reporting of economists (or whoever), openly contradicted. As Kant argued it is a function of philosophy to analyse concepts which are already given but confused.
(Lawson 2005, 44, Economics and Reality)
Michael Joffe uses a complementary, comparative approach, examining theory development in the natural sciences from a historical perspective to generate insight into how other fields of science use diverse types of evidence combined with causal hypotheses to generate empirically based causal theories. Using the history of natural science (i.e., germ theory, plate tectonics, money and banking, growth of the state, etc.) the goal is to learn useful methodologies for theory development. (Joffe 2017, 1, Abstract)
The history of natural sciences provides exemplars of how to develop causal theories based upon multiple sources of evidence and can be useful as a guide in reforming economics. One element of good scientific practice is cross-disciplinary, comparative perspective using a bottom-up focus on the actual practice of scientists. (Joffe 2017, 2-3, Introduction)
Empirically informed causal theories are developed over time, incrementally, and have an ontic rather than an epistemic focus. They place an emphasis on the role of evidence of multiple interlocking kinds (qualitative and quantitative, experimental and observational) in a dynamic iterative process in which diverse types of evidence are considered in light of hypotheses and theory production utilizing a full range of styles of reasoning. Where contextually appropriate, they use empirical research including experimental, observational, and historical analysis. For example,
The way that the correct description of the money-generating mechanism was achieved was by the patient documenting of what actually happens in the financial system, describing how banks really behave (Joffe 2017, 8).
Another example of theory development based on systematic empirical work is a two-volume study of the growth of the modern state (Lindert, 2004). This describes the growth of the state qualitatively and quantitatively in each of the major countries that developed rapidly after the industrial revolution, together with an analysis of the causal factors in that country. It then provides an over-view of the forces behind state growth, while acknowledging the between-country heterogeneity. Thus, it encompasses description, generalisation and explanation, as well as the limits to generalisation imposed by factors specific to each country. This use of comparative economic history is a good model for developing theory, not least because it ensures that any explanation or suggested causal mechanism corresponds to the spatial and temporal patterns that actually occurred, as well as paying attention to specific factors that may have been present in certain countries. (Joffe 2017, 8, emphasis added)
Theory can become a barrier to causal understanding when it becomes myopic; instead of seeing the world as it is, the scope of what can be examined and seen is determined by the dominant theoretical perspective—its starting point is epistemic (axiomatic) not ontic (Joffe 2017, 9). In such situations what can be studied and observed become restricted by philosophical and/or methodological presuppositions. “Economic analysis should be data-first not theory-first (Juselius, 2011).” When substantive (obvious) knowledge is ignored and not incorporated into theory development to maintain either theory or model “purity” of the axiomatic deductive methodology this is frequently done to maintain an implied universality of stories/models of human behavior even in the face of obvious evidence that shows fundamental dissimilarities between different types of economic systems. The purity of the theory must be maintained so it can be explained in terms of universal human attributes or other postulated attributes of human behavior regardless of how unrealistic such postulates are in the real world. An example of such theory induced blindness can be seen in certain economists search for micro foundations akin to physics (Joffe 2017, 9):
Thus, there is a danger that bad theory can be protected by the co-existence of substantive knowledge by “theory” that does not incorporate it. An important instance is the idea that any macro concept, such as that of economic growth, requires “micro-foundations.” (….) The insistence on the need for micro-foundations is held by many economists, but the “news” that growth has had a specific spatial/temporal distribution is not news to them—and therefore it would not be accepted as evidence against the theory. (Joffe 2017, 10)
Addelson similarly notes:
The language of economic theory, like any language provides a framework for thought: but at the same time it constrains thought to remain within that framework. It focuses our attention; determines the way we conceive of things; and even determines what sort of things can be said…. A language, or conceptual framework is, therefore, at one and the same time both an opportunity and a threat. Its positive side is that (one hopes) it facilitates thought within the language or framework. But its negative side arises from the fact that thought must be within the framework. (Coddington 1972: 14-15) (Addelson, Mark. Equilibrium Versus Understanding [Towards the Restoration of Economics as Social Theory]. London: Routledge; 1995; p. 12)
The “conventional starting point” for neoliberal and even some heterodox economics is a top-down axiomatic deductive methodology. Joffe (2017) proposes an evidence-based bottom-up approach in which theories are generated from evidence rather than based on a story or parable about universal human behavior and/or upon hypothetical stylized behavior (i.e., axiomatic deductive methodology). Neither just-so story telling and/or axioms of universal human behavior start with observations of actual occurring processes of observed human behavior. Such abstractions are derived from axioms not observed human behavior and therefore have limited scope and applicability since they don’t take into account actual historical context of time and place.
A different approach is to study human behaviour as it is, e.g. truth-telling (Abeler, Nosenzo, & Raymond, 2016) and cooperation and altruism (Rand, Brescoll, Everett, Capraro, & Barcelo, 2016). This has the potential for developing a theory of economic behaviour that is based on the heuristics people actually use, and to link this with an evolutionary account of the causal processes that led to their existence in our brains (Gigerenzer, Hertwig, & Pachur, 2011; Gigerenzer, Todd, & ABC Research Group, 2000). (Joffe 2017, 12)
Realistic theory can be derived from observations. Evidence, whether experimental or observational, is used in generating new theory. (Joffe 2017, 12) Lines of evidence can be combined. Evidence is diverse, qualitative and quantitative, historical and experimental, and strands of evidence can be combined and/or generate new insights with broad explanatory hypotheses in support of empirically informed theory.
This would be a natural way of developing conceptual categories that correspond to natural categories (“carving nature at its joints”) with strong ontic emphasis and focus on causation. A theory in this sense can also be said to be true or false—or perhaps better, that it is able to possess some degree of truth. (Joffe 2017, 12)
~ ~ ~
Joffe aspires for a value neutralpractice of science that elevates evidence over bias, presuppositions, and prior beliefs. It requires discipline and sincerity to put these prejudices and biases aside and let the evidence lead one wherever it is heading. Just as evidence is the basis of fairness in any judicial context, evidence is also the basis of hypotheses generation in any scientist’s mind when endeavoring to generate theoretical understanding.
After he had come to power in a military coup in 1961, General Park turned ‘civilian’ and won three successive elections. His electoral victories were propelled by his success in launching the country’s economic ‘miracle’ through his Five Year Plans for Economic Development. But the victories were also ensured by election rigging and political dirty tricks. His third and supposedly final term as president was due to end in 1974, but Park just could not let go.Halfway through his third term, he staged what Latin Americans call an x`‘auto-coup’. This involved dissolving the parliament and establishing a rigged electoral system to guarantee him the presidency for life. His excuse was that the country could ill afford the chaos of democracy. It had to defend itself against North Korean communism, the people were told, and accelerate its economic development. His proclaimed goal of raising the country’s per capita income to 1, 000 US dollars by 1981 was considered overly ambitious, bordering on delusional. (Chang, Ha-Joon. Bad Samaritans (p. 6). Bloomsbury Publishing. Kindle Edition.)
President Park launched the ambitious Heavy and Chemical Industrialization (HCI) programme in 1973. The first steel mill and the first modern shipyard went into production, and the first locally designed cars (made mostly from imported parts) rolled off the production lines. New firms were set up in electronics, machinery, chemicals and other advanced industries. During this period, the country’s per capita income grew phenomenally by more than five times, in US dollar terms, between 1972 and 1979. Park’s apparently delusional goal of $1,000 per capita income by 1981 was actually achieved four years ahead of schedule. Exports grew even faster, increasing nine times, in US dollar terms, between 1972 and 1979.4 (Chang, Ha-Joon. Bad Samaritans (p. 7). Bloomsbury Publishing. Kindle Edition.)
The country’s obsession with economic development was fully reflected in our education. We learned that it was our patriotic duty to report anyone seen smoking foreign cigarettes. The country needed to use every bit of the foreign exchange earned from its exports in order to import machines and other inputs to develop better industries. Valuable foreign currencies were really the blood and sweat of our ‘industrial soldiers’ fighting the export war in the country’s factories. Those squandering them on frivolous things, like illegal foreign cigarettes, were ‘traitors’. I don’t believe any of my friends actually went as far as reporting such ‘acts of treason’. But it did feed the gossip mill when kids saw foreign cigarettes in a friend’s house. The friend’s father – it was almost invariably men who smoked – would be darkly commented on as an unpatriotic and therefore immoral, if not exactly criminal, individual. (Chang, Ha-Joon. Bad Samaritans (pp. 7-8). Bloomsbury Publishing. Kindle Edition.)
Spending foreign exchange on anything not essential for industrial development was prohibited or strongly discouraged through import bans, high tariffs and excise taxes (which were called luxury consumption taxes). ‘Luxury’ items included even relatively simple things, like small cars, whisky or cookies. I remember the minor national euphoria when a consignment of Danish cookies was imported under special government permission in the late 1970s. For the same reason, foreign travel was banned unless you had explicit government permission to do business or study abroad. As a result, despite having quite a few relatives living in the US, I had never been outside Korea until I travelled to Cambridge at the age of 23 to start as a graduate student there in 1986. (Chang, Ha-Joon. Bad Samaritans (p. 8). Bloomsbury Publishing. Kindle Edition.)
(….) Korea’s economic ‘miracle’ was not, of course, without its dark sides. Many girls from poor families in the countryside were forced to find a job as soon as they left primary school at the age of 12 – to ‘get rid of an extra mouth’ and to earn money so that at least one brother could receive higher education. Many ended up as housemaids in urban middle-class families, working for room and board and, if they were lucky, a tiny amount of pocket money. The other girls, and the less fortunate boys, were exploited in factories where conditions were reminiscent of 19th-century ‘dark satanic mills’ or today’s sweatshops in China. In the textile and garment industries, which were the main export industries, workers often worked 12 hours or more in very hazardous and unhealthy conditions for low pay. Some factories refused to serve soup in the canteen, lest the workers should require an extra toilet break that might wipe out their wafer-thin profit margins. Conditions were better in the newly emerging heavy industries – cars, steel, chemicals, machinery and so on – but, overall, Korean workers, with their average 53–4 hour working week, put in longer hours than just about anyone else in the world at the time. (Chang, Ha-Joon. Bad Samaritans (pp. 9-10). Bloomsbury Publishing. Kindle Edition.)
Urban slums emerged. Because they were usually up in the low mountains that comprise a great deal of the Korean landscape, they were nicknamed ‘Moon Neighbourhoods’, after a popular TV sitcom series of the 1970s. Families of five or six would be squashed into a tiny room and hundreds of people would share one toilet and a single standpipe for running water. Many of these slums would ultimately be cleared forcefully by the police and the residents dumped in far-flung neighbourhoods, with even worse sanitation and poorer road access, to make way for new apartment blocks for the ever-growing middle class. If the poor could not get out of the new slums fast enough (though getting out of the slums was at least possible, given the rapid growth of the economy and the creation of new jobs), the urban sprawl would catch up with them and see them rounded up once again and dumped in an even more remote place. Some people ended up scavenging in the city’s main rubbish dump, Nanji Island. Few people outside Korea were aware that the beautiful public parks surrounding the impressive Seoul Football Stadium they saw during the 2002 World Cup were built literally on top of the old rubbish dump on the island (which nowadays has an ultra-modern eco-friendly methane-burning power station, which taps into the organic material dumped there). (Chang, Ha-Joon. Bad Samaritans (p. 10). Bloomsbury Publishing. Kindle Edition.)
One of the founders of neoclassical economics, William Stanley Jevons, thought that economics should be a mathematical science, and this is why, even today, most neoclassical economists use a large amount of mathematics in their work. The father of rational expectations theory, Robert Lucas, claimed, in a lecture at Trinity University in 2001, that: “Economic theory is mathematical analysis. Everything else is just talk and pictures”. Motivated, among other things, by these positions, British philosopher of science Donald Gillies wrote an interesting article on the comparison of the use of mathematics in physics and in neoclassical economics. (Sylos Labini, Francesco. Science and the Economic Crisis (Kindle Locations 1788-1793). Springer International Publishing. Kindle Edition.)
Gillies first recalled that physicists have learned to critically consider each theory within the precise limits that are dictated by the assumptions used and by the experiments available. From the times of Galileo and Newton, physicists have, therefore, learned not to confuse what is happening in the model with what instead is happening in reality. Physical models are compared with observations to prove if they are able to provide precise explanations: an example of this type is represented by the procession of the perihelion of Mercury, which we discussed in the previous chapter. Otherwise, theoretical models can provide successful predictions. For example in 1887, Hertz generated the electromagnetic waves postulated by Maxwell in 1873. The question is therefore: can one argue that the use of mathematics in neoclassical economics serves similar purposes? Otherwise, this usage is reduced to a mere rhetorical exercise, which employs the flaunted use of a relatively refined tool to precisely calculate irrelevant quantities. Gillies’s conclusion is that, while in physics mathematics was used to obtain precise explanations and successful predictions, one cannot draw the same conclusion about the use of mathematics in neoclassical economics in the last half century. This analysis reinforces the conclusion about the pseudo-scientific nature of neoclassical economics we reached previously given the systematic failure of the predictions of neoclassical economists. (Sylos Labini, Francesco. Science and the Economic Crisis (Kindle Locations 1794-1804). Springer International Publishing. Kindle Edition.)
To show this, Gillies has examined the best-known works by a selection of the most famous neoclassical economists (Paul A. Samuelson, Kenneth J. Arrow, Gerard Debreu and Edward C. Prescott) in the period from 1945 to the present. The most famous work of Samuelson is one of the classics of mathematical economics, “Foundations of Economic Analysis”. Gillies notes that Samuelson, in his book of over 400 pages full of mathematical formulas, does not derive a single result that can be compared with the observed data. There is even no mention of any empirical data in the book Samuelson! (Sylos Labini, Francesco. Science and the Economic Crisis (Kindle Locations 1804-1808). Springer International Publishing. Kindle Edition.)
As for the seminal work of Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu, published in 1954 and previously discussed, Gillies highlights that the general equilibrium models considered by the authors are based on such simplistic assumptions of reality that they cannot be compared with the observed data. In fact, as Samuelson, they do not derive any result that can be compared with the empirical data, which are indeed absent in their work. (Sylos Labini, Francesco. Science and the Economic Crisis (Kindle Locations 1809-1812). Springer International Publishing. Kindle Edition.)
Finally, Gillies takes into account the article by Edward C. Prescott called “The Equity Premium. A Puzzle”, written in collaboration with Rajinish Mehra. In this article, the authors try to compare the general equilibrium model of Arrow-Debreu with theoretical data obtained from a real economy, namely the US economy in the period 1889– 1978. In this case, there is no agreement between the theoretical results and empirical data. In conclusion, neoclassical economics, unlike physics, has not achieved either precise explanations or successful predictions through the use of mathematics. Thus, this is the main difference between neoclassical economics and physics. (Sylos Labini, Francesco. Science and the Economic Crisis (Kindle Locations 1812-1817). Springer International Publishing. Kindle Edition.)
For more than a decade now, dissatisfaction with the state of economics as a discipline has been growing within its ranks. Much of it has been driven by students and young people who are increasingly aware of the many limitations of what they are being taught at universities across the world, and much more willing to challenge existing dogmas and power structures.
This book is the outcome of a collective effort by such young people, to identify more precisely the source of their unhappiness with the current state of economics and, even more importantly, to highlight how this state of affairs can be changed.
It highlights a wide range of problems within the profession including a lack of diversity and inclusion; harmful hierarchies between countries; a dominant paradigm that fails to address structural inequalities, whitewashes histories of oppression, and undermines democracy and development; and incentive structures that punish economists who seek to venture beyond this paradigm. By presenting these concerns in clear-eyed and courageous ways, it also provides much hope for the future of economics.
We know that much of this dominant paradigm in economics is simply wrong and is being continuously exposed as being wrong: from being over-optimistic about how financial markets work and whether they are or can be ‘efficient’ without regulation, to misplaced arguments in favour of fiscal austerity or the deregulation of labour markets and wages. Critical relationships between humans and nature that form the basis of most material production are dismissed as ‘externalities’. These are only some of the ways in which mainstream economic thinking is either irrelevant or downright misleading in understanding contemporary economic processes and useless or counterproductive in addressing humanity’s most important challenges.
One reason is that much of the mainstream discipline has been in the service of power, effectively the power of the wealthy, at national and international levels. By ‘assuming away’ critical concerns, theoretical results and problematic empirical analyses effectively reinforce existing power structures and imbalances.
Deeper systemic issues like the exploitation of labour by capital and the unsustainable exploitation of nature by forms of economic activity, of labour market segmentation by social categories that allows for differential exploitation of different types of workers, of the appropriation of value, of the abuse of market power and rent-seeking behaviour by large capital, of the use of political power to push economic interests including of cronies, of the distributive impact of fiscal and monetary policies – all these are swept aside, covered up and rarely brought out as the focus of analysis.
This is associated with strict power hierarchies within the discipline as well, which suppress the emergence and spread of alternative theories, explanations and analysis. Economic models that do not challenge existing power structures are promoted and valorised by gatekeepers in the senior ranks of the profession. Alternative theories and analyses are ignored, marginalised, rarely published in the ‘top’ journals, and obliterated from textbooks and other teaching materials. (Ambler, Lucy; Earle, Joe; Scott, Nicola. Reclaiming economics for future generations (Manchester Capitalism) (pp. 16-17). Manchester University Press. Kindle Edition.)
The disincentives for young economists to stray from the straight and narrow path are huge: academic jobs and other placements as economists are dependent on publications, which are ‘ranked’ according to the supposed quality of the journal they are in, in a system that demotes articles from alternative perspectives; promotions and further success in the profession depend on these markers. (Ambler, Lucy; Earle, Joe; Scott, Nicola. Reclaiming economics for future generations (Manchester Capitalism) (pp. 17-18). Manchester University Press. Kindle Edition.)
This combines with the other pervasive forms of social discrimination by gender, racialised identity and location. A macho ethos permeates the mainstream discipline, with women routinely facing the consequences. Along with widespread patriarchy, the adverse impact of relational power affects other socially marginalised categories, according to class, racial and ethnic identities, and language. The impact of location is enormous, with the mainstream discipline completely dominated by the North Atlantic in terms of prestige, influence, and the ability to determine the content and direction of what is globally accepted. The enormous knowledge, insights and contributions to economic analysis made by economists located in the Global South in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean are largely ignored. (Ambler, Lucy; Earle, Joe; Scott, Nicola. Reclaiming economics for future generations (Manchester Capitalism) (p. 18). Manchester University Press. Kindle Edition.)
Then there is disciplinary arrogance, expressed in insufficient attention to history and a reluctance to engage seriously with other social sciences and humanities, which has greatly impoverished economics. Arrogance is also evident in the tendency of economists to play God, to engage in social engineering, couched in technocratic terms which are incomprehensible to the majority of people who are told that particular economic strategies are the only possible choice, in an attitude that collapses into the unethical. (Ambler, Lucy; Earle, Joe; Scott, Nicola. Reclaiming economics for future generations (Manchester Capitalism) (p. 18). Manchester University Press. Kindle Edition.)
Fortunately, there is growing pushback against these tendencies, globally and within the current bastions of economics in the North Atlantic. This book is very much part of that response: challenging the rigidities and power structures within the mainstream discipline, and calling for a more varied, sophisticated, nuanced and relevant understanding of economies. This is, of course, greatly welcome; it is also hugely necessary and urgent, if economics is to reclaim its position as a relevant social science that had origins in both moral philosophy and statecraft. (Ambler, Lucy; Earle, Joe; Scott, Nicola. Reclaiming economics for future generations (Manchester Capitalism) (pp. 18-19). Manchester University Press. Kindle Edition.)
Jayati Ghosh Professor of Economics, University of Massachusetts Amherst, USA; formerly Professor of Economics, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India
Late-Victorian economic doctrine answered the need for an intellectual response to the workers’ challenge, to trade unions, to socialism, to the land reform movement, and to Social Democracy. Liberal economists upheld the existing property order and its inequalities. In Western Europe, North America and Australasia, Social Democracy eventually prevailed over fascism and communism, established welfare states, safeguarded the structures of capitalism, and dominated policy during the first three post-war decades. It sustained economic growth and distributed it more equally. To do this, it had to challenge the assumptions of neoclassical economics, and sometimes to reject them. (Offer, Avner; Söderberg, Gabriel. The Nobel Factor (p. 6). Princeton University Press. Kindle Edition. https://a.co/foDEAma)
In contrast to the competitive free-for-all of orthodox economics, Social Democratic parties in post-war Europe (and in the English-speaking countries) defined a cluster of collective aspirations:
• Collective insurance against life-cycle periods of dependency, regulated and administered by government and paid for through progressive taxation. • Good-quality affordable housing, by means of rent control, new construction, mortgage subsidies, and public or collective ownership. • Secondary and higher education, land use planning, scientific research, culture, sports, roads and railways. • A mixed economy with extensive public services, some nationalized firms, but leaving private ownership to manage production and distribution. • A special concern for disadvantaged groups.13
The United States also went along with a good deal of this programme, and if it failed to provide universal healthcare entitlement, it did provide one for the old and the indigent.
—Offer, Avner; Söderberg, Gabriel. The Nobel Factor (pp. 6-7). Princeton University Press. Kindle Edition. https://a.co/cobZtMt
Japan: Bismark on Rice
DURING A DEBATE AMONG THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES in the spring of 2008, former New York mayor Rudy Giuliani offered a picture of health care in foreign countries: “These countries that say they provide universal coverage—they pay a price for it, you know,” Giuliani explained. “They do it by rationing care, by long waiting lines, and by limiting, or I should say by eliminating, a patient’s choice.” Judging from that, it seems safe to say that Rudy Giuliani has never visited Dr. Nakamichi Noriaki at the Orthopedic Surgery Department of Keio Daigaku Hospital in Tokyo. (Reid, T. R.. The Healing of America (p. 82). Penguin Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.)
In a society that is acutely conscious of hierarchy and rank, Dr. Nakamichi is generally recognized as one of the top orthopedic surgeons in all Japan; his clinic at Keio is perhaps the most respected place in the country for the repair of stiff, aching shoulders like mine. I was first told about him one Thursday morning in Tokyo when I was complaining, as usual, about my shoulder. I called his office to schedule an appointment—and was told to come in that same afternoon. After the familiar poking, patting, massage, and manipulation, Dr. Nakamichi suggested an assortment of different treatments that might work for me; in fact, it was the widest variety of care any doctor had proposed. The treatment available in Japan ranges from acupuncture to injections to manipulation to the total shoulder arthroplasty that my doctor back home had recommended. All the options, he told me, are covered by Japanese health insurance. When I asked how long I would have to wait if I chose the full-scale shoulder-replacement surgery, the doctor checked his computer. “Tomorrow would be a little difficult,” he said. “But next week would probably work.” (Reid, T. R.. The Healing of America (pp. 82-83). Penguin Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.)
In other words: no waiting, no gatekeeper, no rationing, and a broad array of patient choice. Prices are low; as we’ll see, the Japanese system has a rigid cost-control mechanism that favors the patient, at the expense of doctors and hospitals. My out-of-pocket cost for an office visit with the prestigious Dr. Nakamichi in his prestigious clinic came to ¥2,060, or $19 (the doctor charged $64, and insurance pays 70 percent of the bill in Japan). (Reid, T. R.. The Healing of America (p. 83). Penguin Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.)
(….) It’s worth noting that this happens in a largely private-sector system; Japan relies on private doctors and hospitals, with the bills paid by insurance plans. In fact, Japanese doctors are the most capitalist, and most competitive, that I’ve seen anywhere in the world. (Reid, T. R.. The Healing of America (p. 83). Penguin Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.)
(….) Since medical care is so readily available, so easy to get, and so cheap, you might think that the Japanese use an awful lot of medical care. And you’d be right. The Japanese are the world’s most prodigious consumers of health care.1 The average Japanese visits a doctor about 14.5 times per year—three times as often as the U.S. average, and twice as often as any nation in Europe. If you can’t get to the doctor, no problem: Nearly all general practitioners in Japan make house calls, either daily or weekly. (Reid, T. R.. The Healing of America (p. 84). Penguin Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.)
(….) “Japan’s macro health indices, such as healthy life expectancy and infant mortality, are the best, or among the best, in the world,” says Professor Ikegami Naoki, the country’s best-known health care economist. “Now, that’s not all the result of health care. Japan has lower rates of violent crime than most countries, less illicit drug use, fewer traffic accidents, lower rates of HIV infection, less obesity. In terms of keeping people alive and healthy, those factors obviously help. But you also have to give some credit to the health care system for providing universal coverage and egalitarian access without long waiting lists, and we need to credit the doctors and the medical schools for providing a high quality of treatment.” (Reid, T. R.. The Healing of America (p. 85). Penguin Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.)
The Japanese system, in short, provides care to every resident of Japan, for minimal fees, with no waiting lists—and excellent results. This is a good deal for the people of Japan, and they take advantage of it, flocking to clinics and hospitals. To an American, it seems natural that this formula—heavy demand by an aging population, with almost no rationing of care—would add up to a huge national medical bill. But when it comes to costs, Japan has turned the predictable formula upside down. Despite universal coverage and prodigious consumption, Japan spends a lot less for health care than most of the developed nations; with costs running at about 8 percent of GDP, it spends about half as much as the United States. (Reid, T. R.. The Healing of America (p. 85). Penguin Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.)
(….) As we’ll see shortly, not everybody in Japan is happy with the system and its strict cost controls, because the system squeezes cost by sharply limiting the income of medical providers—doctors, nurses, hospitals, labs, drug makers. But if your goal is to provide quality care for everybody at a reasonable cost (which is not a bad goal for any health system), then the Japanese model could be a good one to follow. (Reid, T. R.. The Healing of America (p. 86). Penguin Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.)