Category Archives: Philosophy

Yin-Yang and Three Obediences

The ancient Chinese philosophers believed that the ultimate reality, which underlies and unifies the multiple phenomena we observe, is intrinsically dynamic. They called it Tao the way, or process, of the universe. For the Taoist sages all things, whether animate or inanimate, were embedded in the continuous flow and change of the Tao. The belief that everything in the universe is imbued with life has also been characteristic of indigenous spiritual traditions throughout the ages. In monotheistic religions, by contrast, the origin of life is associated with a divine creator.

(….) The association of manhood with the accumulation of possessions fits well with other values that are favored and rewarded in patriarchal culture expansion, competition, and an “object-centered” consciousness. In traditional Chinese culture, these were called yang values and were associated with the masculine side of human nature. They were not seen as being intrinsically good or bad. However, according to Chinese wisdom, the yang values need to be balanced by their yin, or feminine, counterparts expansion by conservation, competition by cooperation, and the focus on objects by a focus on relationships. As one of us (F.C.) has long argued, the movement toward such a balance is very consistent with the shift from mechanistic to systemic and ecological thinking that is characteristic of our time (Capra 1982, 1996).

Capra, Fritjof (2016) The Systems View of Life: A Unifying Vision (p. 1). Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition.

(….) There are striking parallels between complex systems and the old wisdom of Taoism, which arose from close observation of nature and of human affairs. The Taoist world view is probably best known for its concepts of yin and yang. Yin and yang are often characterised as the female and male principles, but the Tao view is that all things in life have opposites, or polarities, that are also manifestations of yin and yang. Other examples are dark and light, yielding and resistance, intuition and rationality, contemplation and action. In the Tao view there are times for contemplation and times for action. When the world is stable it may not be a good use of energy to try to force change, but if the world is changing, particularly if it is in crisis, then small actions may have large consequences. (….) Taoism counsels that a life lived only at one polarity will be a restricted life. For a full realisation of potential we should not become stuck in an extreme, but should balance yin with yang. Taoism seems to have distilled an essence from the living world: healthy living systems do not depend on competition alone, nor on cooperation alone, but balance both in varying degrees. (Davies, Geoff. Economy, Society, Nature: An introduction to the new systems-based, life-friendly economics.World Economics Association Books Book 3. Kindle Locations 2109-2118).

(….) We can leave the question of what ‘reality’ is ‘behind’ our observations to the metaphysicians and theologians. Unfortunately many scientists became enamoured of the idea that science is in the business of ‘reading the mind of God’. It’s another distraction, unless God’s mind is very changeable and context-dependent. So too can we leave the question of ‘truth’ to others. It is apparently a shocking claim to many people that science is not in the business of revealing Truth. Rather, science is, to emphasise the difference, in the business of inventing useful stories, stories that may be rather loose or may be very precise. (Davies, Geoff. Economy, Society, Nature: An introduction to the new systems-based, life-friendly economics. World Economics Association Books Book 3. Kindle Locations 2402-2408).

— Geoff Davies (2019) Economy, Society, Nature.

[T]he external ki of women is rooted in yin, and so by their ki women are apt to be excitable, petty, narrow, and temperamental. As they live confined to their homes day in and day out, theirs is a very private life and their vision is limited. Therefore, among women compassionate and honest minds-and-hearts are rare indeed. That is why Buddhism says that women are profoundly sinful and have difficulty in achieving {buddhahood}.

Nakae Tōju (573) Learning.

My family tried to raise me as an obedient girl [according to the Three Obediences]: [my mother told me] obey your father, obey your husband, obey your son. And I asked her; if I keep obeying everyone, when does my life start?

A Young Courageous Women Breaking With Tradition

Let it be made clear that Japan has come a long way towards equality of the sexes since Fukuzawa Yukichi’s comments that follow. Progress still needs to be made. Women are too frequently relegated to subservient roles within Japanese corporate culture (e.g., serving tea, being secretaries, or both). Nevertheless, the popular Western appropriation of Eastern philosophy and religion frequently distorts it to such an extent it no longer resembles its factual meaning in historical context and is hardly recognizable. One would never recognize the original message of Lao Tzu or the meaning of the Tao by the sanitized and popularized misappropriation above as Sung-Hae Kim makes obvious:

The Taoists exchanged the metaphoric term “Heaven” (though they still used it occasionally) for a fuller term Tao 道 (literally, the way), and developed the most systematic metaphysics in ancient China. Tao is defined as the indescribable and unnameable origin of all things and the constant principle present in the phenomenal world. Because of their preoccupation with Tao and its ultimate standard that transcends all human relative values, the Taoists were the most radical critics in ancient China. What characterized them was their that man is only a tiny part of the whole transformation of Tao and man has to learn Tao from the phenomenal world. (Kim 1985, 13) (….) Traditionally Lao Tzu has been thought of as the first of the Taoists and senior contemporary of Confucius. The historicity of the person Lao Tzu is still controversial and can probably never be solved. What we have is the text of the 81 short chapters of the book Lao Tzu—now generally accepted to have been written in the fourth or third century B.C.E. (Kim 1985, 101) According to the traditional version, the first chapter of Lao Tzu begins with the indescribability of the Way (Tao 道) and the concluding chapter sums up the way of the sage (sheng-jen 聖人) who embodies the Way concretely in the world. (Kim 1985, 102) The most important term for the Ultimate in Lao Tzu is Tao. The clear definition of Tao as the indescribable ultimate source and origin of all that exists and the constant nurturing principle at the phenomenal level is the most important contribution of Lao Tzu made to the metaphysical thought of ancient China. The famous chapter 1 describes both the transcendent and the immanent character of this ultimate reality. (Kim 1985, 106) As the origin of all things, it is nameless because it is transcendent, but as the immanent principle principle of the phenomenal world, it is called the mother of the world. The concept of Tao that both transcends the phenomenal world as its source and also is present within it as the constant principle, is in fact the metaphysical elaboration of the traditional concept of Heaven. For Lao Tzu, the Tao was both the supreme principle and the absolute reality; it was the reality behind the origin of the universe. (Kim 1985, 107) Heaven (the Tao) is the ultimate reference at the beginning and the end. With its characteristically anthropocentric outlook, the Confucian sage ultimately stands before Heaven for the final judgment of his innocence and success. (Sung-Hae Kim 1985, 138)

— Sung-Hae Kim 1985, 138, The Righteous and the Sage: A Comparative Study on the Ideal Images of Man in Biblical Israel and Classical China. Sogang University.

Taoism was a religion, a metaphysics, and a philosophy that was no less concerned with “reading the mind of God” the Ultimate and Transcendent Reality which they defined as the Tao which the “sage” (sheng-jen 聖人) or “perfect man” (chih-jen) sought to live and rule according to the principles of the Way. Davies is projecting a distorted, shallow, and false Westernized view of Taoism apparently copying Capra and contrasting it with his stereotyped view of early Western ideas as exemplified in the ideas of Newton and others who saw themselves as discovering the laws of God in their scientific discoveries. When so-called scientists engage in facile story telling on topics they know little about and thereby misrepresent an entire religion or philosophy or history for mere rhetorical purposes they are unwittingly demeaning science by reducing it to scientismmyth making. In reality the Torah’s ideal of the righteous man and the Taoist ideal of the perfect man have more in common than Davies’s scientism does with real, sober, and careful science.

Historical context counts; Taoism (along with Confucianism) was a religion and moral philosophy (metaphysical theory of the universe) that was more about maintaining harmony between heaven and earth, which translated into social context meant harmony between the ruling upper class and the ruled lower-classes aimed at maintaining social harmony and civil and political stability. The real interesting aspect of Taoism was its moral precepts that were meant to guide social and economic behavior so-as to maintain social harmony. The ethical precepts have more relevance to economics than some recent Western reinterpretation of what it means to modern science. The idea that the ruler’s behavior must accord to a moral code of conduct embodied in the Way provided a basis upon which the mandate of heaven could be either considered in operation (i.e., they ruled fairly, justly, and upheld moral standards)  or not in operation (i.e., they ruled unjustly, unethically, and for selfish gain and not for the benevolence of the people). These considerations were the ancient Chinese method of determining if the ruler needed to be removed or remain in place; at least that was the theory.

When scientists spoof religion they are doing no better than when creationists spoof science. Spotting the Spoof is a critical skill required for both religionists and scientists and is best served by a sound philosophy (which means ‘the love of wisdom’) that wisely discerns the difference between facts, meanings, and values. Science and religion can only be self-critical of their facts. The moment departure is made from the stage of facts, reason abdicates or else rapidly degenerates into a consort of false logic. Science as sober science is careful; science as story telling is not. Being able to spot the spoof allows one to “distinguish between good, sober, and restrained science on the one hand, and non-empirical metaphysics, fantasy, myth and ideology on the other.” When scientists engage in story telling with little or no regard for fact or truth they are espousing an ideology “transcending the category of provisional scientific theories … [and] constituting a world-view.'” (Alexander and Numbers 2010, Biology and Ideology: From Descartes to Dawkins, Kindle Locations 4215)

For serious, historically accurate, and relevant studies of economics and religion one can look to Michael Hudson (2018) … and forgive them their debts: Lending, Foreclosure and Redemption from Bronze Age Finance to the Jubilee Year or Robert H. Nelson (2001) Economics as Religion: From Samuelson to Chicago and Beyond. Or another classic is Tomas Sedlacek (2011) Economics of Good and Evil: The Quest for Economic Meaning from Gilgamesh to Wall Street. From a Buddhist perspective one can look to Clair Brown (2017) Buddhist Economics: An Enlightened Approach to the Dismal Science. From a Muslim perspective one could look to Ismael Hossein-zadeh (2014) Beyond Mainstream Explanations of the Financial Crisis: Parasitic Finance Capital. For a good analysis of the failures of so-called Compassionate Conservatism see Lew Daly (2009) God’s Economy: Faith-Based Initiatives & the Caring State. No doubt there are many more.

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The equality of men and women Fukuzawa Yukichi 1885, 9–10, 45– 6 (11– 13, 39– 40)

Confucius said, “Whenever there is work to be done, the young will take on its burden; whenever there is wine and food, the old will be the first to enjoy it” [Analects ii. 8]. Borrowing this saying to describe men and women in Japan, “Whenever there is work to be done, women will take on its burden; whenever there is wine and food, men will be the first to enjoy it.”

Women of our country have no responsibility either inside or outside their homes, and their position is very low. Consequently, their sufferings and pleasures are very small in scale. It has been the custom for hundreds and even thousands of years to make them as feeble as they are, and it is not an easy matter now to lead both their minds and bodies to activity and to vigorous health. There are animated discussions on the education of women. No doubt education will be effective. When taught, women will acquire knowledge and the arts.

(….) I once compared the present efforts in schools for the education of women in Japan to caring for a dwarf pine in a pot and hoping it will grow into a big tree. Without doubt, fertilizer is important in a tree’s growth. When it is administered in proper measures and moisture and temperature are controlled, the pine will put out branches and leaves in profusion and their green luster will be beautiful. However, that beauty will be limited to the beauty of a potted plant. One can never hope for its growth into the sublimity of a hundred-foot giant. To rectify the sad state of women’s ignorance, the use of school instruction and such means will not be in vain. A woman may become well versed in science or in literature, even well informed in law. Such a woman may well compete with men in the classroom, but when she returns home from school, in what position does she find herself? (Heisig, James W.; Kasulis, Thomas P.; Maraldo, John C.. Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook (Nanzan Library of Asian Religion and Culture) (p. 601). University of Hawaii Press. Kindle Edition.)

At home, she owns no property of her own, and in society she cannot hope for a position of any consequence. The house she lives in is a man’s house and the children she brings up are her husband’s children. Where would such a person, without property, without authority of any sort, and with no claim on the children she bears, and herself a parasite in a man’s house, make use of the knowledge and learning she acquired? Science and literature will be of no use. Even less would her knowledge in law serve her. The normal reaction of the general public is to regard a woman who discusses law and economics as liable to bring misery upon herself. (Heisig, James W.; Kasulis, Thomas P.; Maraldo, John C.. Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook (Nanzan Library of Asian Religion and Culture) (pp. 601-602). University of Hawaii Press. Kindle Edition.)

(….) On top of all this, suppose that school education were Confucian or Buddhist, and taught such sayings to the effect that women and tools are irredeemable, or that it is a virtue for women to lack wisdom, or that the five faults that women are liable to and the three obediences[8] they must observe are proof that women are sinful by birth. Such education is less than useful, for it serves only to oppress women and to beat into them a kind of “modesty” and “reticence,” resulting in the deformation of even their physical organs—ears, eyes, nose, and tongue. Yet some educators never realize the results of their training. They have veritably been doing nothing but hindering the healthy development of women’s minds and bodies.

(….) Confucianism characterizes men as yang (positive) and women as yin (negative); that is, men are like the heavens and the sun, and women are like the earth and the moon. In other words, one is high and the other is humble. There are many men who take this idea as the absolute rule of nature, but this yin-yang theory is the fantasy of the Confucians and has no proof or logic. Its origins go back several thousand years to dark and illiterate ages when men looked around and whenever they thought they recognized pairs of something, one of which seemed to be stronger or more remarkable than the other, they called one yang and the other yin. For instance, the heavens and the earth looked very much like the ceiling and the floor of a room. One of them was low and trampled on with feet, but the other was high and beyond reach. One was classed yang and the other yin. The sun and the moon are both round and shining; one is very bright, even hot, while the other is less bright. Therefore, the sun is yang and the moon is yin. This is the level of the logic behind this theory and we today should regard it as no more than childish nonsense. (Heisig, James W.; Kasulis, Thomas P.; Maraldo, John C.. Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook (Nanzan Library of Asian Religion and Culture) (pp. 602-603). University of Hawaii Press. Kindle Edition. Bold Added.)

This theory simply attached itself to people’s minds with not much of a basis. On seeing a pair of similar objects, one somewhat superior to the other, they classified the first in the yang category and the other in the yin category. Then they would think up ideas to embellish their theories. That was all. Therefore, between men and women, there never existed any such distinctions as yin and yang. The idea itself being fictional to begin with, there could not have been any actual features to suggest such a theory. But some scholars of the Confucian trend must have felt like belittling women, and for no other reason than their own prejudice, classed women as yin. It was a great nuisance on the part of women to have been thus involved in an empty theory which extended to the sun and the moon and heavens and earth, and which had nothing to do with women’s relations to men. It was truly a misfortune for women to be thus made victims of the Confucian scholars’ ignorance of science. (Heisig, James W.; Kasulis, Thomas P.; Maraldo, John C.. Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook (Nanzan Library of Asian Religion and Culture) (p. 603). University of Hawaii Press. Kindle Edition. Bold Added.)

8. [The five faults are indocility, discontent, slander, jealousy, and silliness. The three obediences are obedience to one’s father while in his care, obedience to one’s husband when married, and obedience to one’s son after one’s husband’s death. Emphasis added.]

Value Crisis of Modernity

There are many examples in the modern world showing how this doctrine of the free market—the pursuit of self-interest—has worked out to the disadvantage of society.

— CAMBRIDGE PROFESSOR JOAN ROBINSON, 1977, cited in Buddhist Economics.

The approach used here concentrates on a factual basis that differentiates it from more traditional practical ethics and economic policy analysis, such as the “economic” concentration on the primacy of income and wealth (rather than on the characteristics of human lives and substantive freedoms).

— NOBEL LAUREATE AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, cited in Buddhist Economics

In Buddhist economics, people are interdependent with one another and with Nature, so each person’s well-being is measured by how well everyone and the environment are functioning with the goal of minimizing suffering for people and the planet. Everyone is assumed to have the right to a comfortable life with access to basic nutrition, health care, education, and the assurance of safety and human rights. A country’s well-being is measured by the aggregation of the well-being of all residents and the health of the ecosystem.

Brown (2017, 2), in Buddhist Economics

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In the most dramatic moments of Italy’s debt crisis, the newly installed “technical” government, led by Mario Monti, appealed to trade unions to accept salary cuts in the name of national solidarity. Monti urged them to participate in a collective effort to increase the competitiveness of the Italian economy (or at least to show that efforts were being made in that direction) in order to calm international investors and “the market” and, hopefully, reduce the spread between the interest rates of Italian and German bonds (at the time around 500 points, meaning that the Italian government had to refinance its ten-year debt at the excruciating rate of 7.3 percent). Commenting on this appeal in an editorial in the left-leaning journal Il Manifesto, the journalist Loris Campetti wondered how it could be at all possible to demand solidarity from a Fiat worker when the CEO of his company earned about 500 times what the worker did.1 And such figures are not unique to Italy. In the United States, the average CEO earned about 30 times what the average worker earned in the mid-1970s (1973 being the year in which income inequality in the United States was at its historically lowest point). Today the multiplier lies around 400. Similarly, the income of the top 1 percent (or even more striking, the top 0.1 percent) of the U.S. population has skyrocketed in relation to that of the remaining 99 percent, bringing income inequality back to levels not seen since the Roaring Twenties. (Arvidsson et. al. 2013, 1-2)

The problem is not, or at least not only, that such income discrepancies exist, but that there is no way to legitimate them. At present there is no way to rationally explain why a corporate CEO (or a top-level investment banker or any other member of the 1 percent) should be worth 400 times as much as the rest of us. And consequently there is no way to legitimately appeal to solidarity or to rationally argue that a factory worker (or any of us in the 99 percent) should take a pay cut in the name of a system that permits such discrepancies in wealth. What we have is a value crisis. There are huge differentials in the monetary rewards that individuals receive, but there is no way in which those differentials can be explained and legitimated in terms of any common understanding of how such monetary rewards should be determined. There is no common understanding of value to back up the prices that markets assign, to put it in simple terms. (We will discuss the thorny relation between the concepts of “value” and “price” along with the role of markets farther on in this chapter.) (Arvidsson et. al. 2013, 2)

This value crisis concerns more than the distribution of income and private wealth. It is also difficult to rationalize how asset prices are set. In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis a steady stream of books, articles, and documentaries has highlighted the irrational practices, sometimes bordering on the fraudulent, by means of which mortgage-backed securities were revalued from junk to investment grade, credit default swaps were emitted without adequate underlying assets, and the big actors of Wall Street colluded with each other and with political actors to protect against transparency and rational scrutiny and in the end to have the taxpayers foot the bill. Neither was this irrationality just a temporary expression of a period of exceptional “irrational exuberance”; rather, irrationality has become a systemic feature of the financial system. As Amar Bidhé argues, the reliance on mathematical formulas embodied in computerized calculating devices at all levels of the financial system has meant that the setting of values on financial markets has been rendered ever more disconnected from judgments that can be rationally reconstructed and argued through.5 Instead, decisions that range from whether to grant a mortgage to an individual, to how to make split-second investment decisions on stock and currency markets, to how to grade or rate the performance of a company or even a nation have been automated, relegated to the discretion of computers and algorithms. While there is nothing wrong with computers and algorithms per se, the problem is that the complexity of these devices has rendered the underlying methods of calculation and their assumptions incomprehensible and opaque even to the people who use them on a daily basis (and imagine the rest of us!). To cite Richard Sennett’s interviews with the back-office Wall Street technicians who actually develop such algorithms: (Arvidsson et. al. 2013, 2-3)

“I asked him to outline the algo [algorithm] for me,” one junior accountant remarked about her derivatives-trading Porsche driving superior, “and he couldn’t, he just took it on faith.” “Most kids have computer skills in their genes … but just up to a point … when you try to show them how to generate the numbers they see on screen, they get impatient, they just want the numbers and leave where these came from to the main-frame.” (Arvidsson et. al. 2013, 3)

The problem here is not ignorance alone, but that the makeup of the algorithms and automated trading devices that execute the majority of trades on financial markets today (about 70 percent are executed by “bots,” or automatic trading agents), is considered a purely technical question, beyond rational discussion, judgment, and scrutiny. Actors tend to take the numbers on faith without knowing, or perhaps even bothering about, where they came from. Consequently these devices can often contain flawed assumptions that, never scrutinized, remain accepted as almost natural “facts.” During the dot-com boom, for example, Internet analysts valued dot-coms by looking at a multiplier of visitors to the dot-com’s Web site without considering how these numbers translated into monetary revenues; during the pre-2008 boom investors assigned the same default risks to subprime mortgages, or mortgages taken out by people who were highly likely to default, as they did to ordinary mortgages.8 And there are few ways in which the nature of such assumptions, flawed or not, can be discussed, scrutinized, or even questioned. Worse, there are few ways of even knowing what those assumptions are. The assumptions that stand behind the important practice of brand valuation are generally secret. Consequently, there is no way of explaining how or discussing why valuations of the same brand by different brand-valuation companies can differ as much as 450 percent. A similar argument can be applied to Fitch, Moody’s, Standard & Poor, and other ratings agencies that are acquiring political importance in determining the economic prospects of nations like Italy and France. (Arvidsson et. al. 2013, 3)

This irrationality goes even deeper than financial markets. Investments in corporate social responsibility are increasing massively, both in the West and in Asia, as companies claim to want to go beyond profits to make a genuine contribution to society. But even though there is a growing body of academic literature indicating that a good reputation for social responsibility is beneficial for corporate performance in a wide variety of ways—from financial outcomes to ease in generating customer loyalty and attracting talented employees—there is no way of determining exactly how beneficial these investments are and, consequently, how many resources should be allocated to them. Indeed, perhaps it would be better to simply tax corporations and let the state or some other actor distribute the resources to some “responsible” causes. The fact that we have no way of knowing leads to a number of irrationalities. Sometimes companies invest more money in communicating their efforts at “being good” than they do in actually promoting socially responsible causes. (In 2001, for example, the tobacco company Philip Morris spent $75 million on what it defined as “good deeds” and then spent $100 million telling the public about those good deeds.) At other times such efforts can be downright contradictory, for example when tobacco companies sponsor antismoking campaigns aimed at young people in countries like Malaysia while at the same time targeting most of their ad spending to the very same segment. Other companies make genuine efforts to behave responsibly, but those efforts reflect poorly on their reputation. Apple, for example, has done close to nothing in promoting corporate responsibility, and has a consistently poor record when it comes to labor conditions among its Chinese subcontractors (like Foxconn). Yet the company benefits from a powerful brand that is to no small degree premised on the fact that consumers perceive it to be somehow more benign than Microsoft, which actually does devote considerable resources to good causes (or at least the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation does so). (Arvidsson et. al. 2013, 3-4)

Similar irrationalities exist throughout the contemporary economy, ranging from how to measure productivity and determine rewards for knowledge workers to how to arrive at a realistic estimate of value for a number of “intangible” assets, from creativity and capacity for innovation to brand. (We will come back to these questions below as well as in the chapters that follow.) Throughout the contemporary economy, from the heights of finance down to the concrete realities of everyday work, particularly in knowledge work, great insecurities arise with regard to what things are actually worth and the extent to which the prices assigned to them actually reflect their value. (Indeed, in academic managerial thought, the very concept of “value” is presently without any clear definition; it means widely different things in different contexts.) (Arvidsson et. al. 2013, 4)

But this is not merely an accounting problem. The very question of how you determine worth, and consequently what value is, has been rendered problematic by the proliferation of a number of value criteria (or “orders of worth,” to use sociologist David Stark’s term) that are poorly reflected in established economic models. A growing number of people value the ethical impact of consumer goods. But there are no clear ways of determining the relative value of different forms of “ethical impact,” nor even a clear definition of what “ethical impact” means. Therefore there is no way of determining whether it is actually more socially useful or desirable for a company to invest in these pursuits than to concentrate on getting basic goods to consumers as cheaply and conveniently as possible. Consequently, ethical consumerism, while a growing reality, tends to be more efficient at addressing the existential concerns of wealthy consumers than at systematically addressing issues like poverty or empowerment. Similarly, more and more people understand the necessity for more sustainable forms of development. And while the definition of “sustainability” is clearer than that of “ethics,” there are no coherent ways of making concerns for sustainability count in practices of asset valuation (although some efforts have been made in that direction, which we will discuss) or of rationally determining the trade-off between efforts toward sustainability and standard economic pursuits. Thus the new values that are acquiring a stronger presence in our society—popular demand for a more sustainable economy and a more just and equal global society—have only very weak and unreliable ways of influencing the actual conduct of corporations and other important economic actors, and can affect economic decisions in only a tenuous way. More generally, we have no way of arriving at what orders of worth “count” in general and how much, and even if we were able to make such decisions, we have no channels by means of which to effect the setting of economic values. So the value crisis is not only economic; it is also ethical and political. (Arvidsson et. al. 2013, 4-5, emphasis added)

It is ethical in the sense that the relative value of the different orders of worth that are emerging in contemporary society (economic prosperity, “ethical conduct,” “social responsibility,” sustainability, global justice and empowerment) is simply indeterminable. As a consequence, ethics becomes a matter of personal choice and “standpoint” and the ethical perspectives of different individuals become incommensurate with one another. Ethics degenerates into “postmodern” relativism. (Arvidsson et. al. 2013, 5, emphasis added)

It is political because since we have no way of rationally arriving at what orders of worth we should privilege and how much, we have no common cause in the name of which we could legitimately appeal to people or companies (or force them) to do what they otherwise might not want to do. (The emphasis here is on legitimately; of course people are asked and forced to do things all the time, but if they inquire as to why, it becomes very difficult to say what should motivate them.) In the absence of legitimacy, politics is reduced to either more or less corrupt bargaining between particular interest groups or the naked exercise of raw power. In either case there can be no raison d’état. In such a context, appeals to solidarity, like that of the Monti government in Italy, remain impossible. (Arvidsson et. al. 2013, 5-6)

There have of course always been debates and conflicts, often violent, around what the common good should be. The point is that today we do not even have a language, or less metaphorically, a method for conducting such debates. (Modern ethical debates are interminable, as philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre wrote in the late 1970s.) This is what we mean by a value crisis. Not that there might be disagreement on how to value social responsibility or sustainability in relation to economic growth, or how much a CEO should be paid in relation to a worker, but that there is no common method to resolve such issues, or even to define specifically what they are about. We have no common “value regime,” no common understanding of what the values are and how to make evaluative decisions, even contested and conflict-ridden ones. (Arvidsson et. al. 2013, 6)

This has not always been the case. Industrial society—that old model that we still remember as the textbook example of how economics and social systems are supposed to work—was built around a common way of connecting economic value creation to overall social values, an imaginary social contract. In this arrangement, business would generate economic growth, which would be distributed by the welfare state in such a way that it contributed to the well-being of everyone. And even though there were intense conflicts about how this contract should apply, everyone agreed on its basic values. More importantly, these basic values were institutionalized in a wide range of practices and devices, from accounting methods to procedures of policy decisions to methods for calculating the financial value of companies and assets. Again, this did not mean that there was no conflict or discussion, but it did mean that there was a common ground on which such conflict and discussion could be acted out. There was a common value regime. (Arvidsson et. al. 2013, 6)

We are not arguing for a comeback of the value regime of industrial society. That would be impossible, and probably undesirable even if it were possible. However, neither do we accept the “postmodernist” argument (less popular now, perhaps, than it was two decades go) that the end of values (and of ethics or even politics) would be somehow liberating and emancipatory. Instead we argue that the foundations for a different kind of value regime—an ethical economy—are actually emerging as we speak. (Arvidsson et. al. 2013, 6)

Laughing Buddha: Jesus as Messiah

One of my most memorable adventures as a cultural intermediary occurred about twelve years ago when I translated for a Christian colleague who was visiting the monastery in southern India where I was living. He was there working on a translation of a Buddhist text, and I volunteered my services as interpreter. One day, in the course of his conversations with one of the senior scholars of the monestary, it came up that he was a Christian, and my teacher asked him to share some of his beliefs. My friend chose to focus on Jesus’ identity as messiah. As I finished translating the words of my colleague, my teacher broke out in a fit of laughter, much to my embarrassment. He then proceeded to question his interlocutor in a kind of pointed and unabashedly adversarial way that is typical of the Tibetan monastic debate courtyard. There ensued a lively exchange, but when all was said and done, my teacher’s basic question was this: How can the death of one individual act as the direct and substantive cause for the salvation of others?

Behind this interreligious impasse there are of course operative several Buddhist doctrinal presuppositions that are in marked contrast (at times even in opposition) to those of traditional Christianity, not the least of which is the Buddhist vision of what constitutes liberation.

Several corollaries to the Buddhist view of liberation are especially relevant as responses to the Christian confession of Jesus as messiah. (1) Each of us is responsible for our own lot in life. We each cause our own suffering, and each of us is ultimately responsible for our own liberation. (2) Our salvation is not dependent on any one historical event. Specifically, our salvation is not dependent upon the appearance of any one personage in history. True, the actions of others can help us or hinder us on the way, but no action (or lack of action) on the part of another individual—whether human or divine—can seal our fate, either as regards salvation or damnation. (3) Soteriologically, there is no end to time, no time after which sentient beings will suffer, and thus long will there be the possibility of their liberation. (4) No being has the capacity to decide whether or not we will be saved. Salvation is not granted to us, or withheld from us, by some external force. It is self-earned. (5) No single action on our part can instantaneously cause our liberation. What brings about salvation is not mere belief or faith, even a faith that is sustained throughout en entire life. Certainly, it is not the instantaneous belief in something (e.g., the belief that Jesus is Lord) that brings about salvation, but the long and arduous process of radical mental transformation, which requires more than simply belief.22

Together these various tenants make it impossible for Buddhists to accept a messianic creed of the traditional Christian sort. Jesus may have been an extraordinary human being, a sage, an effective and charismatic teacher, and even the manifestation of a deity, but he cannot have been the messiah that most Christians believe him to have been.23 (Gross et. al. 2000, 27-28, José Ignacio Cabezón, A God, but Not a Savior, Iliff School of Theology.)

22 I am not unaware of the fact that in the history of Buddhism there have been movements that challenge this notion of the nature and path to salvation. Especially important to mention in this regard are certain schools of Japanese Pure Land Buddhism. But again, I remind my readers that I am speaking here principally from an Indo-Tibetan Buddhist doctrinal perspective.

23 Of course, if the Jesus Seminar is right, than Jesus did not make this claim of himself. See Funk et. al, The Five Gospels, pp. 32-34.

~ ~ ~

It is well known within the comparative religious studies field that there exists a phenomena whereby a founder reveals a teaching of experience and after passing another teaching about the founder develops in the minds of those who are tasked with creating the social institutions that perpetuate the founder’s teachings. It is the teachings of the founder distinct from the teachings about the founder that are important and often lost in historical time until recovered through critical religious scholarship. This of vs. about distinction is important. The teachings of Jesus are distinct and separate from the teachings about Jesus that developed after his death. The atonement doctrine which in light of modernity is nothing more than divine child abuse was a doctrine developed after Jesus lived, taught, and died and is incompatible with the teachings of Jesus as he revealed them through his life and teachings as exemplified in his many parables. The same can is found in the life experience of Siddhārtha Gautama (Sanskrit/Devanagari: सिद्धार्थ गौतम Siddhārtha Gautama, c. 563/480 – c. 483/400 BCE) and many other religious teachers. Similarly the teaching of Honen Shonin were modified by Shinran Shonin’s teachings which were adapted by Rennyo Shonin’s teachings and so on it goes.

It may well seem to you that the gospel of Jesus did not include all that is high and holy in the Christian gospel as we know it. All those magnificent, transcendent, Christian beliefs seem absent from the original gospel of Jesus his “gospel” may seem minimal by comparison with the gospel! Missing from his gospel are not only where he came from (“conceived by the Holy Spirit, born of the Virgin Mary”), but also what he came to do. Where, after all, is “the saving work of Christ”: dying for out sins, rising on the third day, appearing to the apostles resurrected from the dead? These are, after all, the gospel about Jesus, which you, understandably enough, believe and cherish. But if you really are committed to Jesus, then you should be committed to the gospel of Jesus, which is what I have written this book to try to help you see and understand: the “good news” Jesus offered people during his public ministry. (Robinson 2005: 225)

Robinson, James M. The Gospel of Jesus: In Search of the Original Good News. New York: HarperCollins; 2005; p. 225.

Genuinely Creative Thought

2.2 The evolution of the mind: consciousness, creativity, psychological indeterminacy

If consciousness is accepted as real, it seems reasonable that one would allow for an active consciousness, for us to be aware of the experience of thinking and to engage in that experience. If we didn’t allow for engaged and active thought in consciousness, then consciousness would seem to be a passive “ghost in the machine” sort of consciousness. Siegel (2016) would appear to be in agreement with this notion insofar as he sees the mind as a conscious regulator of energy and information flow. But if we allow consciousness to be real in this manner, we allow the possibility of thoughts which exist for no reason other than “we” (the phenomenological “I” (Luijpen, 1969)) think them consciously and actively. The existence of such a thought does not itself break the principle of sufficient reason (Melamed and Lin, 2015), but the “I” thinking them might. That the “I” brings into being a conscious thought might be the terminus of a particular chain of causation. (Markey-Towler 2018, 8)

We call such thoughts to exist “genuinely creative thought”, they are thoughts which exist for no reason other than they are created by the phenomenological “I”. The capability to imagine new things is endowed by the conscious mind. This poses a difficulty for mathematical models which by their nature (consisting always of statements A ⇒ B) require the principle of sufficient reason to hold. Active conscious thought, insofar as it may be genuinely creative is indeterminate until it exists. However, that we might not be able to determine the existence of such thoughts before they are extant does not preclude us from representing them once their existence is determined. Koestler (1964) taught that all acts of creation are ultimately acts of “bisociation”, that is, of linking two things together in a manner hitherto not the case. Acts of creation, bisociations made by the conscious mind, are indeterminate before they exist, but once they exist they can be represented as relations Rhh’ between two objects of reality h,h’. We may think of such acts of creation as akin to the a priori synthetic statements of which Kant (1781) spoke. (Markey-Towler 2018, 8)

This is no matter of mere assertion. Roger Penrose (1989) holds, and it is difficult to dismiss him, that the famous theorems of Kurt Gödel imply something unique exists in the human consciousness. The human mind can “do” something no machine can. Gödel demonstrated that within certain logical systems there would be true statements which could not be so verified within the confines of the logical system but would require verification by the human consciousness. The consciousness realises connections in this case truth-values which cannot be realised by the machinations of mathematical logic alone. It creates. The human mind can therefore (since we have seen those connections made) create connections in the creation of mathematical systems irreducible to machination alone. There are certain connections which consciousness alone can make. (Markey-Towler 2018, 9)

The problem of conscious thought goes a little further though. New relations may be presented to the consciousness either by genuinely creative thought or otherwise, but they must be actually incorporated into the mind, Rhh’g(H)μ and take their place alongside others in the totality of thought g(H)μ. Being a matter of conscious thought by the phenomenological “I”, the acceptance or rejection of such relations is something we cannot determine until the “I” has determined the matter. As Cardinal Newman demonstrated in his Grammar of Assent (1870), connections may be presented to the phenomenological “I”, but they are merely presented to the “I” and therefore inert until the “I” assents to them accepts and incorporates them into that individual’s worldview. The question of assent to various connections presented to the “I” is an either/or question Newman recognises is ultimately free of the delimitations of reason and a matter for resolution by the “I” alone. (Markey-Towler 2018, 9)

There are thus two indeterminacies introduced to any psychological theory by the existence of consciousness:

1 Indeterminacy born of the possibility of imagining new relations Rhh’ in genuinely creative thought.
2 Indeterminacy born of the acceptance or rejection by conscious thought of any new relation Rhh’ and their incorporation or not into the mind μg(H). (Markey-Towler 2018, 9)

The reality of consciousness thus places a natural limit on the degree to which we can determine the processes of the mind, determine those thoughts which will exist prior to their existence. For psychology, this indeterminacy of future thought until its passage and observance is the (rough) equivalent of the indeterminacy introduced to the physical world by Heisenberg’s principle, the principle underlying the concept of the “wave function” upon which an indeterminate quantum mechanics operates (under certain interpretations (Kent, 2012; Popper, 1934, Ch.9)). (Markey-Towler 2018, 9-10)

2.3 Philosophical conclusions

We hold to the following philosophical notions in this work. The mind is that element of our being which experiences our place in the world and relation to it. We are conscious when we are aware of our place in and relation to the world. We hold to a mix of the “weak Artificial Intelligence” and mystic philosophies that mind is emergent from the brain and that mind, brain and body constitute the individual existing in a monist reality. The mind is a network structure μ = {H g(H)} expressing the connections g(H) the individual construes between the objects and events in the world H, an architecture within which and upon which the psychological process operates. The reality of consciousness introduces an indeterminacy into that architecture which imposes a limit on our ability to determine the psychological process. (Markey-Towler 2018, 10)

~ ~ ~

My own philosophical views differ from the assumptions underlying Markey-Towler. To say that “mind is emergent from the brain and that mind, brain and body constitute the individual existing in a monist reality,” is essentially a form of physical monism that claims mind “emerged” from matter, which really explains nothing. If the universe (and humans) are merely mechanisms and mind is reducible to matter we would never be able to be aware of our place in and relation to the universe nor would there ever be two differing philosophical interpretations of our place in the universe. The hard problem (mind-brain question) in neuroscience remains a debated and unsettled question. There are serious philosophical weaknesses in mechanistic materialism as a philosophical position, as is discussed in Quantum Mechanics and Human Values (Stapp 2007 and 2017).

Semantic Negligence (揚げ足)

What is at the stake is the whole structure of a discipline. Can you imagine such a thing in geology or geophysics? It is something similar to replacing modern physics by another. Probably you cannot understand the real issue of economics.

Yoshinori Shiozawa, 2/5/2018, Personal Communication

Arguments do not always wear their true purpose on their face, nor are [we] required to take them at face value.

Martha Nussbaum (2008, 343-344) in Liberty of Conscience

Logic is a subtle science. It was discovered in Classical Greece, but it was not formalized in any other areas in the classical age. Mathematics began also in Classical Greece and developed in Alexandrian age, but it did not develop as logical science in other areas until the Greek influence arrives. A typical case is East Asia which includes China, Korea and Japan. After the 17th century in Japan, geometry became a kind of intellectual hobby and many posed problems asking others to solve them. We can find very complicated problems which comprise a dozen of circles but the notion of proof did not develop in Edo period (before 1867). (Of course, this is a very rough description.)

[All this history is simply a red herring, a distraction form his real purpose, which he hides.]

In my long life with various people, I came to understand that there are many people who never understand logic. Ernst Haeckel is famous by his recapitulation theory, i.e., “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny.” But we may not be able to apply his thesis to human thinking. It may not be correct to assume that everybody arrives at the logical stage. Some people may stay at the pre-logical stage even if they become adult. Logic is a subtle science. It was discovered in Classical Greece, but it was not formalized in any other areas in the classical age. Mathematics began also in Classical Greece and developed in Alexandrian age, but it did not developed as logical science in other areas until the Greek influence arrives. A typical case is East Asia which includes China, Korea and Japan. After the 17th century in Japan, geometry became a kind of intellectual hobby and many posed problems asking others to solve them. We can find very complicated problems which comprise a dozen of circles but the notion of proof did not develop in Edo period (before 1867). (Of course, this is a very rough description.)

My personal experience taught me that it is often useless to argue with those people. Logical persuasion never works for them. My first experience was in my college student days. We talked about syllogism. I argued that syllogism is not based on experience and cited this case:

Pig is mortal.
Socrates is a pig.
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

My colleague never understood that this is a correct syllogism. He insisted that this syllogism is wrong because the small premise is false.

— Shiozowa Yoshinori, Real World Economic Review (RWER), 7/19/2017

Logic can be used to clarify as well as to be obfuscate; to make one’s meaning clear or to hide one’s true meaning; to illuminate truth or hide behind bullshit. Yoshinori’s purpose is to abuse logic to engage in ad hominem, a form of unethical word-play, the sole purpose of which is demean another person via arrogant intellectual intimidation by accusing them of being hopelessly pre-logical. Yoshinori is engaging in “world play” above, using a form of semantic negligence in that he could, if sincere and a descent human being, be explicit in the difference between sound and unsound logical arguments and the difference between valid syllogism, but unsound argument (i.e., the conclusion doesn’t necessarily follow from the false premises), and a valid syllogism with a sound argument (i.e., the conclusions follows necessarily from true premises). An argument that is valid is one where the premises if true necessarily lead to the conclusion. And argument that is sound is one where premises necessarily lead to the conclusion and the premises are actually true. Hence, an argument can be perfectly valid syllogism even with false premises, but an unsound argument in which the conclusion is true not by necessity, but by accident or manipulation meant to obscure truth and/or confuse or demean someone, which seems to be the purpose of Yoshinori’s argument above.

Bullshit is pretension or over-portentousness: discourse which may or may not be superficially complex but which over-intellectualises the straightforward, the obvious, sometimes even the trivial and banal. Bullshit includes evasion, elision, insincerity, procrastination and other forms of dissembling in discourse that fall short of lying, which is very common in, though hardly exclusive to, politics.

Gary Hardcastle, George Reisch. Bullshit and Philosophy: Guaranteed to Get Perfect Results Every Time (Popular Culture and Philosophy Book 24) (p. 199). Open Court. Kindle Edition.

Semantically negligent definitions are parasitical on this process [search for truth or clarity]: they foreclose argument about doubtful identities by disguising them as definitions. Hidden arguments are difficult to criticize—but also easy to ignore. Thus the semantically negligent definer may gain short-term rhetorical advantage by disguising his arguments as definitions, but risks the backfire effect, which is a direct consequence of his neglect of the full meaning of his redefined expression. For a definition to be semantically diligent any concealed arguments must be made explicit to all parties. Moreover, if the proposers hope for their definition to prevail, these arguments must be won.

Gary Hardcastle, George Reisch. Bullshit and Philosophy: Guaranteed to Get Perfect Results Every Time (Popular Culture and Philosophy Book 24) (p. 168). Open Court. Kindle Edition.

Yoshinori Shiozawa confuses sophistry with logic, equating a quest for deeper understanding with the manipulation of words for an untrue purpose merely to win an argument. He wraps insult in pseudo-history to sound erudite, as dishonest intellectuals like to do, but it is really nothing more than debased ad hominem. Shiozawa is playing a dishonest sematic word play game. The same can be said about Shiozawa’s disingenuous, manipulative, and false use of Ernst Haeckel’s biogenetic law, which he cites for rhetorical purposes even though it has long been disproven (Laubichler and Maienschein 2007: 2-3, From Embryology to Evo-Devo. Dibner Institute Studies in the History of Science & Technology Series. MIT Press.). He doesn’t even get his historical and scientific facts correct. This is not science, but scientism.

Yoshinori Shiozawa lacks the wisdom to understand that while logic is valid in the material world and mathematics is reliable when limited in its application to physical things, neither is to be regarded as wholly dependable or infallible when applied to life problems. Life embraces phenomena which are not wholly material and not all of life’s problems are mathematically tractable.

Arithmetic says that, if one man could shear a sheep in ten minutes, ten men could shear it in one minute. That is sound mathematics, but it is not true, for the ten men could not so do it; they would get in one another’s way so badly that the work would be greatly delayed. Mathematics asserts that, if one person stands for a certain unit of intellectual and moral value, ten persons would stand for ten times this value. But in dealing with human personality it would be nearer the truth to say that such a personality association is a sum equal to the square of the number of personalities concerned in the equation rather than the simple arithmetical sum. A social group of human beings in coordinated working harmony stands for a force far greater than the simple sum of its parts. Quantity may be identified as a fact, thus becoming a scientific uniformity. Quality, being a matter of mind interpretation, represents an estimate of values, and must, therefore, remain an experience of the individual. When science, philosophy, and religion become less dogmatic and more tolerant of criticism, philosophy will then begin to achieve unity in the intelligent comprehension of the universe.

Yoshinori Shiozawa is afflicted with mathematical pride and statistical egotism, not to mention spiritual blindness. He engages in ” trivial, and pointless forms of mathematization” (Roi 2017, 4) while pushing a utterly useless literature-only (Payson 2017) style of so-called “economics” on daily basis on Real World Economics Review blog. He is more like a used car salesman, hawking his lemonshis pseudo-scientific literature-only papers and bookspronouncing ex cathedra a New Central Dogma (which I’ll deal with more fully in another post).

Whiggish History qua Scientism

You have gotten a good number of ardent supporters, but many of them are feeble minded people who believe that they can change economics if they denounce mathematics and natural sciences. They are simple minded anti-scientists.

Yoshinori Shiozawa, RWER: Lars Syll, New Classical macroeconomists — people having their heads fuddled with nonsense, 2/13/2018

This is not the first time Shiozawa has engaged in such sophistry and sematic negligence, as his performance on the WEA Conference forum reveals:

It is interesting to learn that, as an economist and social scientist, I must be in a “pre-Copernican” stage. Although what this means is not totally clear to me, I take it as revealing that our presuppositions about scientific practice differ. You claim to know what is the most appropriate way of investigating the subject I address, and that this way is the methods and tools of natural science. I claim to have devised a way which works, without knowing if it is the most appropriate, a thing whose decidability would seem to be quite problematic. And the way I have devised meets the conditions of a reflective epistemology of scientific practice, in natural science as well as in social science.

Your presupposition is that the application of the methods of natural science is the yardstick for social science. This is scientism.

Robert Delorme, A Cognitive Behavioral Modelling for Coping with Intractable Complex Phenomena in Economics and Social Science. In Economic Philosophy: Complexity in Economics (WEA Conference), 12/1/2017, italics added.

Yoshinori Shiozawa likes to engage in nasty ad hominem accusing others of being feeble minded while arrogantly pontificating a whig interpretation of the history of science (e.g., see Brush). Nussbaum correctly points out that we are not required to take such arguments on their face value, and neither should reasonable people take such disingenuous, ahistorical arguments seriously, let alone at face value.

Shiozawa’s ahistorical whig interpretation of history can be clearly seen in an exchange on RWER (it is assumed the exchange was deleted because of Shiozawa’s nasty ad hominem):

Do you [i.e., Ken Zimmerman] know that you are proving by yourself that your range of imagination is heavily biased…. If history of science (not the sociology of science; they are very different disciplines) focuses exclusively on the factors “from scientific training, to professionalism, to informal education, to friendships, to hunches, etc.”, you are excluding the most important entity or driver in a history of science.  A science is a system of theories (including and concerning concepts, observations, measurement, experiences, data, etc.) that seeks coherence. The internal logic of the system is much more important than all other social factors in which you are interested. The latter are by-players and cannot and should not be a main player. Your history of science is really the tragedy (or rather comedy?) without the prince of Denmark…. [Y]ou are repeating this kind of misplaced arguments. You pretend to have studied history of sciences (it may be true), but you have studied it through the looking glass of sociology of science. In the history of science there are specialists who are called externalists. They often give a new fresh air to the history of science. So I do not deny that they have some roles in the history of science(s). In the history of economic thought there are also externalists. Philip Mirowski is an example. On the opposite extreme of externalists, we have internalists. My paper on An Origin of the Neoclassical Economics is written from the internalist point of view. In this case, I questioned why John Stuart Mill was guided by an internal logic of the problem he wanted to solve (probably despite of his wish) to open a way to the neoclassical economics. If sociology of science can be included among the history of science(s), it belongs to the strand of externalists. It cannot be the core of history of science(s), because it lacks understanding of the main motive of scientific development.

Yoshinori Shiozawa, RWER: Asad Zaman’s Radical paradigm shifts, 7/17/2017

Your views on the history and sociology of science are dated. In 1970, they would have been appropriate. But not today. Formally speaking the two are separate. Separate department offices, chair persons, class schedules. But in theory and practice the two work together closely today. You seem to believe that sciences are magical. That “systems of theories” can somehow take science and scientists out of human ways of life, human culture, and human societies. That’s not possible. So, the same factors that enter these enter science as well. To use the phrase favored by many sociologists of science, science is “constructed in interactions of humans with one another and with the non-human.” That includes the systems of theories you mention, as well as the methods, tools (language, including mathematics, cultural standards, etc.) that are the basis of scientific work. It also includes every variation of logic and formal analytic philosophy, from which notions of coherence and sense-making in science emerge. Your statement, “The internal logic of the system is much more important than all other social factors in which you are interested” was rejected nearly 50 years ago by first sociologists and then historians of science. To accept it would mean accepting that science is somehow “supernatural” – beyond the bounds of human experience. Neat analogy with Hamlet. But by making it you undermine your entire argument.

The last major article on the externalism-internalism debate in historiography was in 1992 by Steven Shapin. It’s not so much as the debate was won as that sociologists and historians lost interest in it. It’s not resolvable. But since the 1980s in practice the externalist position dominates most work in the history and sociology of science. So, your paper, if written from the internalist perspective is unusual. For example, the only way we can assume that John Stuart Mill was “guided” by an internal logic is to assume that Mill never participated in human communities, never engaged with his fellow humans, or with the world around him. From going to the Pub, to dating, to attending college, etc. As to the main motive of scientific development, there isn’t one I’m or most historians/sociologists are able to identify. I’ve worked with or observed work by a few hundred physical scientists. Most have multiple reasons for pursuing and building science. Most do not agree on what those motivations are or should be. Not surprising.

Check out: Science in Action (1987), Bruno Latour; Laboratory Life (1979), Steven Woolgar and Bruno Latour.

Ken Zimmerman’s reply to Shiozawa, RWER: Asad Zaman’s Radical paradigm shifts, 7/18/2017

Underlying the externalist-internalist rhetoric is the assumption that there are “factors extrinsic to the putative value-free application of the scientific method,” while “Economic and/or social factors influencing scientific inquiry are externalist.” The idea that there exists a domain of “scientific inquiry … free of values except for the search for truth (Hook, 2002; 3-7)” is a myth of scientism.

In the last quarter of the twentieth century discussions of the interplay of science and society have outgrown the crude dictums of historical materialism, as well as transcending the incoherent dichotomy of internalist and externalist intellectual histories. To cite just a sampling, the writings on the history of science of Brush (1978), Barnes and Shapin (1979), Mackenzie (1981), Freudenthal (1986), Elster (1975), Breger (1982) Sohn-Rethel (1978), Latour (1987), Pickering (1984), Collins (1985), Markus (1987), Forman (1971), and Porter (1981a, 1985, 1986) are evidence of a great flowering of efforts all concerned with a reconsideration of the interplay of science and social forces. [We can add Hook (2002) to this long list.]

— Philip Mirowski (1989, 106-107) More Heat than Light: Economics as Social Physics, Physics as Nature’s Economics

Shiozawa’s use of externalist-internalist rhetoric is dated, anachronistic, ahistorical; he is foolishly blinded by his own hubris. He is espousing scientism, a pseudo-scientific belief about science that is blissfully ignorant of the real nature of science. Shiozawa is espousing a whig interpretation of history:

Sometimes people want to know the presently accepted “right answer” to a question before studying its history…. For the historian of science, this uncertainty about the correct answer does have one important advantage. It undermines the tendency to judge past theories as being right or wrong by modern standards. This tendency is the so-called “Whig interpretation of the history of science” that one usually finds in science textbooks and popular articles. The Whig approach is to start from the present theory, assuming it to be correct, and ask how we got there. For many scientists this is the only reason for studying history at all; Laplace remarked, “When we have at length ascertained the true cause of any phenomenon, it is an object of curiosity to look back, and see how near the hypothesis that have been framed to explain it approach towards the truth” (1966: vol. 4, 1015). Sometimes people want to know the presently accepted “right answer” to a question before studying its history….

But Whiggish history is not very satisfactory if it has to be rewritten every time the “correct answer” changes. Instead, we need to look at the [scientific theories] of earlier centuries in terms of the theories and evidence available at the time. Sometimes people want to know the presently accepted “right answer” to a question before studying its history.

Brush, Stephen G. (1996) Nebulous Earth: The Origin of the Solar System and the Core of the Earth from Laplace to Jeffreys. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Shiozawa, ignorant of his own pseudo-scientific interpretation of science, no doubt, would accuse Stephen G. Brush of being an externalist, despite the fact of his distinguished career as a scientists prior to turning to history. What does it say when scientists of a far greater caliber than Shiozawa categorically disagree with his whiggish interpretation of history?

A Case of Psychological Projection aka Pre-Logical Argumentum

What is at the stake is the whole structure of a discipline. Can you imagine such a thing in geology or geophysics? It is something similar to replacing modern physics by another. Probably you cannot understand the real issue of economics.

— Yoshinori Shiozawa, 2/5/2018, Personal Communication

This blog is attracting all those who are emotionally frustrated in the actual economy and economics. This is a dangerous symptom.

— Yoshinori Shiozawa, RWER, The Biggest Problem in Science, 7/31/2019

It appears that subtle science of logic escapes Yoshinori in his pre-logical fallacy above. Unfortunately for Yoshinori any clear thinking and reflective person understands perfectly well what Yoshinori is doing above; he is engaging in, to use his own rhetoric, pre-Freudian unconscious psychological projection of his own deepest illogical fears upon others and then couching such projections in pseudo-intellectual sophistry and nonsense (たわごと). Yoshinori is revealing he lacks self-awareness of his own state of mind and behavior, projecting onto others his own confused and flustered state of mind (慌てふためく), his own frustration and worry (はらはらする). Probably he cannot understand the real nature of what he is doing.